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This report represents the culmina-
tion of a two-year research process
involving the cooperation of well over
100 individuals from all sectors of our
community. The object of study, the
Portland Development Commission, is
connected to so many aspects of life
in Portland that your committee could
have continued its research indefinite-
ly. In investigating the many arenas in
which PDC operates, we have learned
a great deal about how our city works.
In this report, our intent is to describe
the challenging terrain through which
PDC navigates its urban renewal,
housing and economic development
activities. The organization is large,
complex and dynamic. It serves
diverse constituencies and faces chang-
ing and competing demands and
expectations. While PDC often is in
the spotlight and frequently is scruti-
nized and criticized, your committee
found a general lack of specific
knowledge about PDC among mem-
bers of the public.
In this report, your committee
shares its observations and critiques of
PDC in its three primary areas of
operation. While we found many
aspects of PDC’s work worthy of
praise, we also found areas in need of
significant improvement. Of particu-
lar note are your committee’s concerns
about the nature of PDC’s relation-
ship with the Portland Family of
Funds, a private entity about which
many readers may know very little. At
the same time, your committee has
observed that PDC is making
improvements in many of the areas
addressed in this report. We may even
hope that our inquiries themselves
stimulated some of these changes.
In the final days of editing this
report, two significant events
occurred. On November 24, 2004,
Portland’s newest urban renewal area
was formed. The Willamette
Industrial Urban Renewal Area covers
751 acres in the industrial areas of
North and Northwest Portland. On
December 31, Vera Katz ended her
third and final term as mayor of
Portland making way for the swearing-
in of Tom Potter as the 46th mayor of
Portland. Because of the timing of
these events relative to the completion
of this study, they are not discussed
herein.
Your committee deliberately chose
not to include an executive summary
for this report because we believe
PDC’s complexity defies simplifica-
tion. Our findings, conclusions and
recommendations constitute our exec-
utive summary. Readers should not
draw conclusions about PDC too
quickly; the issues at stake are too
important and too complex to be
turned into sound bites. Instead, we
hope that you, the reader, by reading
the entire report, will gain a clearer
and fuller understanding of the effects
this important and powerful organiza-
tion has on our city and our lives.
PROLOGUE
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PART I — WHAT IS THE PORTLAND 
DEVELOPMENT COMMISSION?
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The Portland Development
Commission (PDC) is one of the most
powerful organizations in Portland and,
due to its broad scope and complex
financial structure, is one of the most
difficult to assess. Since its inception in
1958, PDC has been a quasi-independ-
ent agency with sweeping powers to
foster new development by purchasing
or condemning and developing and
assembling public and private property.
During the last 16 years (fiscal years
1988-89 through 2003-04), PDC
received average annual revenues from
all sources of nearly $80 million dollars,
which it has used to leverage millions
more in private investment. To put this
in context, the city's general fund tax
revenues for 2003-04 were $370 mil-
lion. PDC is entrusted with the devel-
opment of up to 15 percent of
Portland's land. However, no one at
PDC is elected. Oversight is vested in
a single city commissioner, currently
the mayor. City Council exercises con-
trol only through its power to ratify
mayoral appointments to the PDC
Commission and its authority to estab-
lish, amend and extend urban renewal
areas and issue urban renewal bonds.
PDC's original legislative charge was
to relieve Portland of blight and urban
decay. In 1979, the Oregon Legislature
expanded the definition of "blight" to
include "[a] growing or total lack of
proper utilization of areas, resulting in
a stagnant and unproductive condition
of land potentially useful and valuable
for contributing to the public health,
safety, and welfare" [ORS
457.010(1)(h)]. Over the past four
decades ideas about decay and blight
have changed, allowing PDC to devel-
op any land that it views as "underuti-
lized." Today, PDC describes its mis-
sion as "to bring together resources to
achieve Portland's vision of a diverse,
sustainable community with healthy
neighborhoods, a vibrant urban core, a
strong regional economy and quality
jobs for all citizens."  PDC's unique sta-
tus as a semi-autonomous quasi-gov-
ernmental agency makes it a flexible
and responsive model to build unique
private-public partnerships and capture
opportunities as they arise, while its
governmental status allows it to coordi-
nate federal, state and local funding
sources.
Portland has a national reputation as
a "livable city," and its downtown has
been turned into a model envied by
many cities. PDC's role in downtown
is clear but its efforts to improve out-
lying neighborhoods have been less
successful. In accomplishing its mis-
sion, PDC often has been motivated by
opportunities developed in private,
which considerably limited or even
foreclosed significant public knowledge
and participation. Furthermore, these
opportunities often were not consid-
ered in the context of traditional urban
planning, a system designed specifically
for public input. The tension created
between these "opportunities" and tra-
ditional "planning" will be addressed
later in this report.
A. Introduction
6In August 1971, after a two-year
study of the first 13 years of PDC's
operation (1958 to 1971), City Club of
Portland concluded that
"Subordination of urban renewal to
comprehensive community planning
can best be accomplished by abolish-
ing the Portland Development
Commission as an independent,
autonomous agency, and creating a
city department to undertake urban
renewal. Such a department should
also have responsibility for the func-
tions of the City Planning
Commission, the Housing Authority
of Portland and the Bureau of
Buildings."  While echoes of the prob-
lems identified by the 1971 City Club
report persist today, your committee
does not consider abolition of PDC
and transfer of its functions to City
Council, or a department directly
under the supervision of the mayor or
one of the commissioners, to be the
solution. However, at least two other
recommendations of the 1971 report
remain relevant:
• "Urban renewal should be 
undertaken only as part of
a determined comprehensive 
planning effort …" 
• "Plans must be developed 
from the beginning with the 
assistance of citizens,
particularly those in affected 
areas with plans at all stages 
widely disseminated."
In June 1991, City Club issued a
report on Tax Increment Financing in
Oregon. Tax Increment Financing
(TIF) has been the major source of
funding for PDC and is explained later
in this report beginning on pages 8
and 50. The 1991 report took into
account the impact of 1990 property
tax limitation initiative, Measure 5, but
was written before Measures 47, 50
and the Shilo Inn decision threatened
PDC's primary funding source, Tax
Increment Financing. As a result of
these measures, TIF has been placed
squarely in competition with the oper-
ating budgets of local governments
for a limited pot of money raised by
property taxes.*   In 1991, the majority
report concluded that TIF was a use-
ful tool for economic development
and recommended it remain available
to and be used by the community.
The minority recommendation, which
was not adopted, suggested that
before using TIF, it should be deter-
mined that  "but for" using TIF, rea-
sonably comparable development in
the area would not occur.
In March of 2003, City Club
undertook this study of PDC with the
charge of examining PDC's mission,
governance, structure and accountabil-
ity to the Mayor, City Council and the
public. Your committee spent nearly
two years in its studies and delibera-
tions, interviewed more than 70 wit-
nesses and examined voluminous doc-
uments. The study was undertaken in
a spirit of cooperation with PDC that
continued throughout the process.
B. Prior City Club Reports
* See Shilo Inn v. Multnomah County et al., 333 Or 101 (Dec. 2001, modified Feb. 2002), in which the 
Oregon Supreme Court refused to exempt TIF from the 10 percent limit on local governments 
taxation ability. See page 13, infra.
7C. Creation and Expansion of PDC
* The constitutionality of this law was upheld in Foeller v. Housing Authority of Portland, 198 Or. 205.
When the "greatest generation"
returned home from World War II, it
found a nation President Roosevelt
described, in 1937, as one-third "ill
housed."  To provide housing for the
baby boom generation, Congress
funded many
programs to stim-
ulate new hous-
ing. The federal
Housing Act of
1949 launched
"urban renewal"
to fund slum
clearance by local
authorities and
permit re-devel-
opment by pri-
vate enterprise.
In 1949, the
Oregon
Legislature seized
the chance for
federal funding
and passed imple-
menting legisla-
tion authorizing
local public hous-
ing authorities to permit clearance,
planning for and redevelopment of
blighted areas.*   During most of the
1950s, the city of Portland, through its
Housing Authority, acted as the
agency for projects that might qualify
for federal funds. When, in 1952, City
Council placed on the ballot a $2 mil-
lion bond to fund the Vaughn Street
project, a proposal that would have
removed dilapidated housing to make
way for light industry and warehous-
ing, the voters resisted. The defeat of
this measure dampened urban renewal
efforts until the election of Mayor
Terry Schrunk in 1956. In 1957, the
Oregon Legislature, at the suggestion
of Mayor Schrunk's
Advisory Committee
for Urban Renewal,
adopted the basis of
Oregon's current
Urban Renewal Law
(ORS Chapter 457).
This law authorized a
municipality to act as
its own renewal
agency or establish a
separate agency, to
deal with "blighted
areas," defined as
"areas, that by reason
of deterioration,
faulty planning, inade-
quate or improper
facilities, deleterious
land use or the exis-
tence of unsafe struc-
tures, or any combi-
nation of these factors, are detrimental
to the safety, health or welfare of the
community."  
In 1958, Portland voters narrowly
approved a new Chapter 15 of the city
charter creating a new Department of
Development and Civic Promotion to
be administered by the Portland
Development Commission. Unlike
most other city departments adminis-
tered by the mayor or by one of the
Oregon’s Urban Renewal
Law authorized a municipality
to act as its own renewal
agency or establish a separate
agency, to deal with "blighted
areas," defined as "areas,
that by reason of deteriora-
tion, faulty planning, inade-
quate or improper facilities,
deleterious land use or the
existence of unsafe structures,
or any combination of these
factors, are detrimental to the
safety, health or welfare of
the community."
’
8elected city commissioners, PDC is governed by five independent commissioners,
appointed by the mayor and subject to approval by City Council. In addition to
its state-granted authority to act as the urban renewal agency in the city and out-
side, "within a five-mile radius of the city's boundaries [sic]," the city charter dele-
gated to PDC the power, with City Council approval, to promote industrial expan-
sion and location, to acquire property inside or outside the city in accordance with
comprehensive zoning and development plans and to lease unneeded municipal
property to new industries. Today, PDC also exercises authority to enter into
inter-governmental agreements beyond the five-mile limit and engage in numerous
activities beyond the state statutes' authorization of urban renewal, generally
under the rubric of "economic development." 
PDC's five commissioners serve three-year staggered terms. Commissioners
select their chair and secretary and serve "without salary or any compensation of
any nature."  They have the authority to appoint, employ and discharge officers as
they choose, including the executive director, employees and agents, including but
not limited to clerical staff, experts, appraisers, accountants and other technicians,
craftspersons and laborers, and fix and provide for their compensation. Except
for the executive director, the director's secretary, an assistant director and con-
sulting or technical employees, permanent officers and employees of PDC are
subject to the Civil Service provisions of the city's charter. PDC currently 
(2004-05 budget) has a staff of over 200—approximately 174 permanent employ-
ees and 32 limited-term employees. According to PDC, its employee pay scale is
reasonably comparable with similar positions in other city departments.
D. Funding for PDC
It is axiomatic that an analysis of an agency's budgets may tell more about what
the agency does than a thousand words. To provide a comprehensible way to "fol-
low the money," PDC, at the request of your committee, compiled a series of
charts and graphs, not previously available, taken from disparate sources. Because
of the significant impact of the tax revolt measures of the 1990s, this compilation
starts with fiscal year 1988-89 and continues through fiscal year 2003-04, which
ended June 30, 2004. The reader may glean much about PDC by a review of these
past 16 years of its operations, which includes a table reflecting the average period
of time it takes to repay TIF bonds, in the following Appendices:
Appendix D, the “Urban Renewal Areas Key Facts” summary gives starting
and ending dates for 17 urban renewal areas, seven of which are now closed and
10 of which still open.*  It took an average of 24-1/2 years to repay the TIF
bonds in the closed areas; it will take an average of nearly 43 years to repay TIF
* On November 24, 2004, after the above charts and graphs were compiled, City Council, by a 5-0 
vote, created an eighteenth urban renewal area, the Willamette Industrial Urban Renewal Area,
covering 751 acres including Swan Island and Mocks Bottom in North Portland, plus land on the 
west bank of the Willamette River.
9bonds in the currently open urban
renewal areas and as long as 54 years to
repay bonds for the Downtown
Waterfront Urban Renewal Area.
Appendix F shows all PDC actual
revenues and expenditures, as well as
expenditures for each urban renewal area
(URA) for fiscal years 1988-89 through
2003-04. Because the information is
compiled from different sources, it is sub-
ject to qualifications.* 
Appendix G titled "Actual
Expenditures by Operating
Department" depicts comparative
expenditures over the 16 years, fiscal
year 1988-89 through 2003-04 for
"development," "economic develop-
ment," and "housing," while the graph
"Actual Expenditures for All Urban
Renewal Areas Combined" compares
the expenditures for all urban renewal
areas over these same years, demon-
strating the substantial increase in
expenditures during the last six years,
made possible by Measure 50.
Federal funding, through block
grants and otherwise, stimulated much
of urban renewal in the PDC's early
days. Since the adoption of a state
constitutional amendment in 1960 and
implementing legislation in 1961, a
major part of funding for urban
renewal comes from tax increment
financing. Oregon became the 
second state, following California, to
adopt TIF as a method of financing
renewal projects. Forty states now use
TIF.
Explaining TIF in detail would
require a separate report.1 In short,
when an urban renewal plan is adopted
by City Council, the existing tax base
within the URA is "fixed" until the
bonds issued to pay for the projects in
the URA are repaid (see figure on page
10). During that time, all tax revenue
generated within the area over that
generated on the "fixed" base is avail-
able to PDC to pay interest and princi-
pal on these bonds. Many of these
projects provide the infrastructure
needed to accommodate new develop-
ment by private enterprise. TIF bonds
are revenue bonds issued by the city
and backed by TIF revenues but not by
the city's full faith and credit, i.e., the
city is not responsible for paying either
principal or interest other than from
TIF revenues. However, City Council
approval is required to adopt each
urban renewal plan preceding the
issuance of any bonds. Until the
bonds are fully paid, taxes collected on
the increase of value in the district
over the frozen adjusted base, including
the increase in value which might have
accrued even had urban renewal not
occurred, are dedicated first to their
repayment. Once the bonds are paid,
the full value of the property returns to
* Qualifications
• Revenues and Expenditures are taken from annual budget documents. Ending Balance and Beginning 
Balance figures are taken from annual audited statements (Comprehensive Annual Financial Report).
Figures in these budget documents present the data in a different format than the audited 
statements. Figures taken from these documents vary from one another, but for this analysis the 
variation is not substantive.
• While audited figures are more accurate, they do not break down the expenditures by operating  
department, information your committee specifically requested for its analyses. That level of detail 
comes from the budgets.
• Discrepancies between total expenditures by operating departments and totals by urban renewal 
areas are attributed to the latter figures coming from audited statements that include reserve 
funds.
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How Tax Increment Financing Works
Source: Portland Development Commission
M
O
N
EY
TIME
1 YR 5 YRS 10 YRS 15 YRS 20 YRS 25 YRS 30 YRS
FIXED-BASE
These funds continue going to other
tax jurisdictions regardless of 
improvements.
Year after which no more
bonds can be issued 
TAX INCREMENT
20-Year Bonds Issued Year 5
20-Year Bonds Issued Year 10
Paid Year 25
Paid Year 30
All bonds paid off
returned to tax rolls
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the tax rolls of local governments.
TIF has been used virtually from the
outset of PDC's activities, starting
with the South Auditorium project in
1958.
During the 1970s, major changes
were made to urban renewal laws and
the use of TIF. At this time, the origi-
nal emphasis on housing was aban-
doned in favor of revitalizing business
districts and the use of TIF for this
purpose became particularly attractive
because, unlike general obligation
bonds, TIF bonds require no voter
approval. In 1977, an interim legislative
task force was appointed to review a
perceived lack of public participation
and lack of fiscal accountability in
urban renewal. The task force report
resulted in significant 1979 legislative
amendments to the urban renewal laws.
The amendments permitted TIF to be
used for economic development with-
out housing and redefined "blight" as
lack of "proper utilization" of land.
These amendments also required a
more open public process for the cre-
ation of new urban renewal areas and
capped, at 15 percent, the total amount
of a municipalities' assessed value and
the total land area that could be includ-
ed in urban renewal areas at any one
time. The economic downturn and
high interest rates of the early 1980s
limited the role of TIF to be used only
as an economic stimulant.
Like all other taxes, property taxes
directed to pay TIF bonds ran head on
into the buzz saw of the emerging anti-
tax movement of the 1990s. Voter
approval in the early 90s of Measure 5
virtually brought TIF to a halt.
Measure 5 amended the Oregon
Constitution to establish a limit of $10
per $1,000 of the assessed values that
could be taxed for local government
and $5 for $10,000 that could be
assessed for schools, forcing all users of
those taxes to be "compressed" within
that maximum available "tax pie."
Because general obligation bond debt
repayment was exempt from Measure 5
limits, issuers of TIF bonds hoped their
bonds, too, would be exempt. The
Oregon Supreme Court held otherwise,
and the voters' refusal to pass Measure
1 in 1993 ended the argument.
When fully implemented in the 1995-
96 tax year, Measure 5 had reduced
property tax rates to less than half what
they were in 1990-91. However, tax bills
did not go down since the real market
value of property to which this fixed
rate was applied was increasing so rapid-
ly. Because Measure 5 did not decrease
taxes as its promoters had hoped, they
initiated and, in 1997, voters approved
Measure 47. The measure was so poor-
ly drafted that it seemed "unworkable,"
causing the Legislature to refer Measure
50 to the voters to make implementa-
tion of Measure 47's major features fea-
sible. In essence, the assessed values of
property as of 1995-96 were frozen and
permitted to be increased, if at all, only
by a maximum of 3 percent a year.
Payment of existing TIF bonds was not
exempted from the $10 per $1000 limit.
However, a special levy was created that
allowed existing urban renewal areas the
choice of three options to compensate
for the revenue lost from capping the
growth of the assessed value at 3 per-
cent.*   In the spring of 1998, PDC and
* See ORS 457.435 for a description of the three options, the details of which are not material to 
this report.
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City Council selected Option 3 for four existing plans — Downtown Waterfront,
South Park Blocks, Oregon Convention Center and Airport Way — and Option 1
for Central Eastside. These additional taxes are reflected on property tax statements
as "Urban Renewal — Portland."  
In 2001, the Oregon Legislature passed a law to exempt taxes for certain urban
renewal areas from the above limitations. Once again the Oregon Supreme Court
in the Shilo Inn case ruled that all TIF bond payments must be included in the $10
per $1,000 cap for all local governments and forced TIF proceeds to be taken from
this limited pot of tax revenues shared by all local governments.
While Measure 50 again made TIF bonds feasible in existing URAs, urban renewal
dollars now compete directly with the operating budgets of the city of Portland,
Multnomah County, public schools and other local taxing districts for a limited pot of
tax revenues. The competition between TIF dollars for urban renewal and the needs
of other taxing jurisdictions holds for all URAs; however, the Option 3 districts actually
return some dollars back to these districts. Because of the competition for property
tax revenue, projects funded by TIF now receive more careful scrutiny by the local
governments whose budgets are "compressed" by TIF financing. This little-under-
stood fact explains the increasing attention paid by PDC to seeking the city of Portland
and Multnomah County as "partners" in its development projects. It is fair to say that
PDC has become the "capital funds" partner of our local governments. PDC, through
TIF, in essence uses a part of the total tax revenues available for local government
service programs, such as police, fire and human services, and applies them to capital
infrastructure programs such as streets, sewers, water and parks. Given the strains on
local budgets to maintain essential government services and the unlikely prospect of
voter approved general obligation bonds for capital improvements, TIF bonds seem to
be the only feasible way for the city and Multnomah County to finance significant new
capital projects.
While TIF has been the primary funding source for PDC's urban renewal activities,
it has not been an effective mechanism for funding economic development. In addi-
tion to TIF, for fiscal year 2002-03, PDC received about $1 million from the city's
General Fund, and in fiscal year 2003-04 it received $673,872, to use for unrestricted
economic development. This led PDC to seek other sources of funding. When
Congress adopted the New Market Tax Credit Program in December 2000, PDC saw
an opportunity to secure additional funding for economic development. This program
was established to encourage investors to invest $15 billion nationwide in Qualified
Community Development Entities (CDEs) during the years 2001 through 2007. Each
investor receives a tax credit of 5 percent for the year of investment and each of the
following two years and 6 percent for each of the next four years, for total tax credits
equal to 39 percent of the investment. CDEs are required to invest the funds in proj-
ects within low-income (distressed) federally qualified census tracts.*  In essence, the
federal government pays 39 percent of the investment and the investor 
* In Portland, these distressed neighborhoods are clustered around the Old Town/Union Station areas 
on the Westside, in the Northeast and North areas along the east side of the Willamette River, in the 
Airport Way area, in the Northeast/Southeast corridor east of 82nd Avenue and in a strip of 
Southeast, north of Holgate and south of Division.
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pays 61 percent.
Because the use of these credits — as well as credits for historic preservation
— is compatible with the mission of PDC to renew distressed urban areas, PDC
saw these tax credit programs as a means of obtaining additional financing. To
do this PDC, conceived and incubated the Portland Family of Funds with the
"Unifying Principal [sic] & Mission: To create development opportunities and
financial resources for profitable investments which improve the economic vitality
of communities in need."  The umbrella Portland Family of Funds Holdings, Inc.
(PFFH) was incorporated under ORS Chapter 65 on August 27, 2002, as a "mutu-
al benefit" nonprofit corporation.*  
The first fund developed by PFFH was for the Armory project, a $28 million
project to acquire the 1891 Oregon National Guard Armory Annex at N.W. Davis
Street and 10th Avenue and develop it into a new facility to house Portland Center
Stage, featuring a 546-seat main stage, a smaller 253-seat theater in the round,
rehearsal space and offices. It has projected that financing will come from, among
other resources, a $4.6 million loan of River District (the Pearl District) urban
renewal funds, a $10.6 million loan plus $2 million in Historic Tax Credits from
U.S. National Bank, both guaranteed by the city of Portland, and $8.6 million in
New Market Tax Credits brought to the project by Goldman Sachs, an investment
firm, which had secured the tax credits in the first round of applications to the
federal government in fiscal year 2002-03.
PDC's public records documenting these arrangements include a flow chart
prepared by PDC (see page 81) of interlocking Limited Liability Companies
(LLCs) all of which are essentially managed by PFFH. Details of the entities
involved in the financial structure of the Armory project are set forth in
Appendix C.
In the second round of applications, in May 2004, PFFH secured three awards
totaling $196.5 million in New Market Tax Credits:
• $100 million were allocated to the "Portland New Market Fund I" 
(PNMF I)† (controlled by the PDC) to use in a 12-block span of
the Oregon Convention Center Urban Renewal Area along Northeast Martin 
Luther King, Jr. Boulevard. Lenders and investors listed are PDC, Piper 
Jaffrey, Wells Fargo, GMAC, MMA, Hunter Chase, U.S. Bank and 
Washington Mutual.
• $72.5 million will go to the "Hospitality Fund I" (controlled by Sage 
Hospitality Resources) to be used for the rehabilitation of the historic 
downtown Meier & Frank building, which when completed will house 
a luxury hotel on the top floors and a Meier and Frank store 
on the lower floors. Lenders and Investors are listed as Sage,
Hexagon, PDC, Bank of Nova Scotia, Piper Jaffrey and Chevron.
* The anticipated list of activities in which the PFFH might engage covers a list of 10 areas, including 
housing and community revitalization, small business debt funding, real estate development and 
providing resources for faith-based organizations.
† Not to be confused with the Portland New Market Investment Fund II involved in the Armory project.
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• $24 million will go to "Historic Rehabilitation Fund I" (controlled by 
Gerding/Edlen) to save and restore historic Portland buildings.
Lenders and investors are listed as Piper Jaffrey, PDC and Chevron.
According to PDC, the applications for these awards used PDC's track record
of years of successful work in urban renewal areas to assure the U.S. Treasury
Department of the competent use of these tax credit investments. In an effort to
further enhance these applications, PFFH represented that PDC would have final
approval over each project for which the requested tax credit investments would
be used. These complicated arrangements and the obvious dependence of PFFH
on the support of PDC contribute to the concerns and recommendations that are
expressed later in this report.
E. Evolution of PDC's Role and Mission
During the 1950s and '60s, PDC
functioned exclusively as a traditional
urban renewal agency. It acquired
and assembled land, with substantial
use of condemnation, cleared proper-
ties and relocated residents and busi-
nesses, using TIF and federal moneys,
then sold improved parcels to private
developers. This period, known as the
Ira Keller "Era of Grand Projects,"
was typified by the South Auditorium
project, which cleared out the old, but
still vital, immigrant communities of
"South Portland." The period was
marked by secrecy, substantial neigh-
borhood distress and litigation over
condemnation and relocation.
When, in June 1969, City Club
launched its long-range study of urban
renewal in Portland, it dealt with an
urban renewal agency that had dis-
placed 580 families and 1,950 individu-
als, creating a demand for 2,500 alter-
native housing units, while adding only
80 low-income units to Portland's
available housing stock. That, among
other reasons, caused City Club, on
August 27, 1971, to recommend that
the city abolish the Portland
Development Commission and create
a department under City Council con-
trol to subordinate urban renewal to
comprehensive community planning.
One of then City Commissioner
Goldschmidt's chief aides co-authored
the City Club report and Goldschmidt
himself promised that as mayor he
would abolish PDC. When he became
mayor, however, he instead requested
resignations of all PDC commission-
ers and appointed a new Commission.
After that, there was no further dis-
cussion of abolishing PDC.
Congress' adoption of the
Demonstration Cities and
Metropolitan Development Act of
1966, known as "Model Cities," and
subsequently the Neighborhood
Development Act, caused the city to
move from the era of grand projects
to small-scale neighborhood rehabilita-
tion projects. By 1978, PDC had
funded 24 neighborhood conservation
programs, fueled by block grants pro-
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vided by the federal Housing and Community Development Act of 1974.
Accompanying this focus on neighborhood projects, Portland's City Council
established the Office of Neighborhood Associations (now the Office of
Neighborhood Involvement) to facilitate the establishment of and thereafter sup-
port 60 neighborhood associations throughout the city. During this period,
spurred by federal requirements, the public was increasingly included in PDC
planning and in the physical rehabilitation of housing, as well as in related federal
programs encompassing education and social services. Mayor Goldschmidt also
created the Office of Planning and Development to coordinate city planning and
the agencies involved. The second director of the Office of Planning and
Development, Mike Lindberg, hired the young Don Mazziotti to work on policy
and research. Mazziotti is now PDC's executive director.
Also in the 1970s and 1980s, along with neighborhood rehabilitation, PDC
refocused urban renewal on restoring Portland's downtown, as articulated in the
city's Downtown Plan of 1972. Stopping the Mount Hood Freeway proposal and
constructing MAX light rail instead increased the momentum to improve down-
town. During this period, the Downtown Waterfront urban renewal district was
formed, leading to the construction of Pioneer Courthouse Square, the replace-
ment of Harbor Drive with Tom McCall Waterfront Park, the development of
River Place, the expansion of the transit mall, the building of three large parking
garages, the improvement of Union Station and the creation of Pioneer Place
mall. This is a prime example of where PDC urban renewal successfully followed
and implemented the prospective vision of the city's planning authorities.
The previously mentioned tax limitation measures of the 1990s forced a sub-
stantial change in PDC and launched what has been called the "Post-Modern"
period. This transition has been marked by an increasing focus on mixed-use
development, greater participation by the private sector and increased community
involvement. These 15 years (1990-2004) have also seen a gradual increase in
resources allocated to the more amorphous realm of "economic development."
PDC now states its mission and vision as follows:
To bring together resources to achieve Portland's vision of a diverse,
sustainable community with healthy neighborhoods, a vibrant urban 
core, a strong regional economy and quality jobs for all citizens.
To invest resources, time and professional talent into helping other people 
succeed. Through a dynamic combination of financial programs, planning 
and project management, construction projects, and technical expertise,
we help grow business and jobs, help revitalize neighborhoods, help 
low-income families buy or repair homes, and ensure new housing is 
available to people of varying incomes. Simply put, we are a customer 
service organization linking people and resources to help make 
Portland a great place to live.
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As PDC's role has grown to encompass economic development, it now consid-
ers one of its goals to facilitate the growth and diversification of business activity
that (1) creates jobs, income and wealth, and (2) creates investment that generates
municipal revenue to fund the provision of facilities and services that maintain
and enhance our quality of life. While acknowledging that its jurisdiction for
urban renewal projects is limited by the city charter to an area within five miles of
the city's boundaries, PDC considers itself to be "a special governmental agency,"
statutorily able to form "inter-governmental agreements" beyond this five-mile
limitation for matters not related to urban renewal projects. Indeed, by treating
PDC as its "economic development department," the city, in effect, broadly con-
strued the charter provisions that permit PDC to "promote industrial expansion
and location" and acquire property both inside and outside the city. At present,
PDC plays a key role in supporting the Regional Economic Development Partners
(operating under the name "Portland Regional Partners for Business"), a nonprofit
corporation at present consisting of 27 members, a majority of which are public
agencies; two are utilities and the remainder consists of private entities. These
regional partners seek to coordinate economic development throughout a six-
county area that includes Clark County, Washington. Because PDC employs
architects, economists, lawyers and others associated with development, it staffs
many of these intergovernmental economic planning efforts. For example,
Gresham has contracted with PDC for some of its economic development activities.
F. PDC's Major Areas of Operation 
Apart from its administrative
departments, PDC functions through
three operating departments, "Urban
Renewal (Development)," "Economic
Development" and "Housing."
1. Urban Renewal (Development)
encompasses the traditional real estate-
based urban renewal projects involving
assembling, clearing, preparing for
development and reselling land for
development by private parties. Major
urban development and redevelopment
necessarily involve housing and eco-
nomic development components.
Development constitutes most of
PDC's activities in urban renewal areas,
beginning with South Auditorium, the
earliest, to South Waterfront, the most
recent. In its 46 years of existence,
PDC has created a total of 17 urban
renewal areas; seven of which have
been completed and 10 of which are
ongoing: Airport Way, Central
Eastside, Downtown Waterfront,
Gateway Regional Center, Interstate
Corridor, Lents Town Center, Oregon
Convention Center/Inner Northeast,
River District, South Park Blocks and
South Waterfront.*  
2. Economic Development is the
most recent addition to PDC's mis-
sion. While economic development is
* See footnote on page 8 about the creation of Portland’s eighteenth urban renewal area.
typically thought of as specific efforts to foster a healthy, growing economy, it is
clear that most everything government does affects economic development: tax
policies, federal fiscal policies, infrastructure construction and maintenance, educa-
tion and job training, land use planning and transportation facilities, to name only
a few. For some, governments' roles in economic development should be limited
to these traditional functions. To them, "build the livable city and they will come"
is a more effective form of economic development than specific efforts through
tax breaks and abatements and other inducements to recruit new companies to
locate here or stay here. For others, economic development involves specific activ-
ities designed to increase jobs and help businesses start, expand, move into or
remain in the area. It is difficult to define in isolation PDC's economic develop-
ment role, as Urban Renewal/Development and Housing are themselves very sig-
nificant components of economic development.
Evaluating economic
development is difficult and
controversial. This is largely
because techniques for evalu-
ation are difficult to devise
and, even then, seldom
applied. Differences of
opinion exist as to whether
efforts should be focused on
recruiting new businesses to
the area or on maintaining
and expanding businesses
already in the area, whether
to focus on large employers
or small ones, and whether to
work with national chains or
locally-owned businesses.
PDC is not only the city's
Economic Development
department, but through the
Regional Economic
Development Partners, has
taken a leading role in eco-
nomic development for the
entire metropolitan area.
The Regional Partners have
grown from 10 to 27 mem-
bers with annual dues and
extra contributions close to
$225,000. This is a small
PDC's Economic
Development Programs
Business Development focuses on the
retention or expansion of existing businesses
and recruiting firms who will integrate with
and strengthen the region's existing base.
Business Loans include both monetary
loans and technical assistance to businesses
within a specific urban renewal area.
Enterprise Zone is a program PDC
administers for the city in the
North/Northeast Portland Enterprise Zone.
It offers five-year property tax abatements
for qualified businesses expanding or relocat-
ing within the zone.
Industry Development focuses assistance
to industry sectors identified as having good
potential compatibility with Portland area
resources.
Storefront Improvement makes matching
grants to businesses in urban renewal areas to
improve their building facades.
Small Business Support seeks to identify
and remove impediments to the formation,
survival, and growth of small businesses. City
Council in March 2003, established the Small
Business Advisory Council staffed by the
Small Business Advocate at PDC.
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number when compared with PDC's
economic development budget.
While PDC acts as the economic
development agent for the city as a
whole, TIF funds can be used only in
the urban renewal area in which they
are generated. The fact that a sub-
stantial part of its budget revenues are
from TIF funds limits much of PDC's
economic development efforts to the
15 percent or less of the city within
urban renewal areas.
For the eight years from 1988-89
through 1995-96, the annual budget
for PDC's economic development
department averaged slightly over $2.9
million. For the next eight years,
1996-97 through 2003-04, it averaged
nearly $18 million. In fiscal year 2003-
04, over one-half of the expenditures
for economic development were used
for economic development loans and
the Economic Opportunity Fund,
about 15 percent went to the Seismic
Loan Program, 6 percent to Business
Retention and Recruitment and 20
percent went to payment of salaries,
materials and services. Most of the
balance went to direct financial assis-
tance and capital outlays.
PDC develops its own five-year
goals and each year sets annual goals
within these five-year frameworks. In
2003-04 it set a goal of "creating or
retaining" 1,000 jobs as a result of
PDC loans, grants or tax abatements.
It reports as of March 2004 having
created or retained 1,237 jobs, and
forecasting an additional 193 by the
end of the 2003-04 fiscal year.
3. Housing involves rehabilitation
of existing housing stock and those
portions of urban renewal projects
that provide new housing. Prior to
1958, the Housing Authority of
Portland was the urban renewal agency
for Portland. The 1958 Charter
Amendment, Chapter 15, provided
that PDC "automatically, by its forma-
tion, assume all duties and obligations
of the Housing Authority of Portland,
Oregon, relative to urban renewal and
redevelopment, upon the relinquish-
ment by the Housing Authority of
Portland, Oregon, of such duties and
transfer of any funds obligated there-
to."  Since then, PDC has subsidized
the private development of market
and low-cost affordable housing in
urban renewal areas, while the
Housing Authority continues to devel-
op and operate low-income housing
throughout the city, using mostly fed-
eral funds.
The term "affordable housing" is
difficult to define and subject to mis-
use.*  Essentially, it refers to housing
that is subsidized in some manner to
make it available to those whose
income would not otherwise enable
them to afford it. The federal and
commonly used standard is that a
household should not have to spend
more than 30 percent of its income
for total housing costs. Because PDC
is charged with improving access and
quality of housing in general, it classi-
fies "affordable housing" as housing
available to households earning up to
150 percent median household income
and subsidizes housing projects up to
that income level. Households eligible
for low-income "affordable housing"
fall into three categories of median
household income (see inset page 20).
The figures for each category are
*  For a thorough understanding of affordable housing, please refer to City Club's 2002 report,
"Affordable Housing in Portland."
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based on the 2004 median
household income of
$67,000 for a family of four.
Portland's housing poli-
cies support "balanced com-
munities," i.e. "that neigh-
borhoods throughout
Portland collectively reflect
the diversity of housing
types, tenures (rental and
ownership) and income lev-
els of the region."  PDC is
to strive to achieve this city-
wide balance "in the central
city, Gateway Regional
Center, in town centers and
in large redevelopment proj-
ects."  About 25 to 40 per-
cent of PDC's annual
expenditures are for housing
in urban renewal areas.
PDC's housing goals and policies are governed by a combination of the Metro
2040 Plan and Portland's Comprehensive Plan. Their housing mission is to "bring
together community resources to achieve Portland's vision of a vital economy
with healthy neighborhoods and quality housing for all citizens."  PDC housing
programs cover:
• Single Family Programs, helping homeowners rehabilitate 
their homes and first-time buyers purchase homes.
• Multi-Family Services, assisting owners to build or rehabilitate 
multi-family residential structures.
• Housing Preservation, administering federally subsidized 
programs serving households at or below 60 percent Median 
Family Income.
• Housing Development Incentives, providing help to housing 
developers in the form of property tax exemptions and waivers 
of various development fees.
Income Categories for Low-Income
Affordable Housing (2004)
Median Household Income (MHI):
$67,000
Low income:
50-80% of MHI     
$33,950 to $54,300
Very low income:
30-50% of MHI       
$20,350 to $33,950
Extremely low income:
0-30% of MHI  
Under $20,350
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PDC straddles the line between public agency and private enterprise, enticing
resources from the private for-profit sector in order to reach public goals of the
community. PDC's role as a bridge between private interest and public good leads
to three primary tensions:
Tension 1: Opportunism v. Planning — Should PDC take advantage of
opportunities as they arise or be constrained by the long-term planning 
goals of the city? 
Tension 2: Flexibility and Speed v. Accountability, Transparency and 
Public Involvement — Should PDC have the flexibility, speed and 
confidentiality necessary to take advantage of these opportunities or 
should it be bound by the same standards of accountability and 
transparency expected of government agencies?
Tension 3: Return on Investment v. Livability and Quality of Life — 
Should PDC be evaluated by the financial return on its investments or 
by the physical cityscape and communities it helps make possible? 
Your committee found these three ten-
sions so pervasive that we have organized
much of our analysis of PDC's urban
renewal efforts around them.
These basic tensions explain much of
the difference in the testimony your com-
mittee heard about PDC. Overall, most
witnesses praised the quality of develop-
ment influenced by PDC and the "feel" of
Portland resulting from the organization's
contribution. When critiquing the organi-
zation, witnesses from the private sphere
— developers, small business owners and
investors — were more likely to criticize PDC for behaving too much like a gov-
ernment agency, for having "pie in the sky" visions that ignore market realities, for
being too slow and too bureaucratic, and for holding endless public hearings. The
elected officials and citizen activists interviewed by your committee were more
likely to fault PDC for insufficient public involvement and for being too solicitous
to business interests.
PART II — DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS
A. Urban Renewal (Development)
PDC straddles the line
between public agency and private
enterprise, enticing resources
from the private for-profit sector
in order to reach public goals of
the community.
’
Tension 1: Opportunism v. Planning
Who drives development in Portland is not completely clear. Although
Portland's Bureau of Planning is officially charged with planning for the city's
growth, PDC and the private sector also determine the type and rate of develop-
ment within the city. In investigating the semi-autonomous, quasi-governmental
nature of PDC, your committee found that PDC's flexibility did increase its effec-
tiveness. However, your committee also found that this latitude decreases trans-
parency and makes it difficult for the public to hold PDC accountable.
It is clear to your committee that PDC's great strength is its ability to use
financial incentives to encourage private development that meets broader city
goals, whether or not that development had been foreseen in existing city plans.
The River District — commonly referred to as the Pearl District — may be the
most positive example of how PDC has worked with private developers to pro-
mote objectives such as infill and density, while integrating new development with
public transportation and public spaces.
The River District plan was a private sector initiative spearheaded by the largest
property owners in the district, not by the Bureau of Planning or City Council. It
was the landowners who had the original vision for turning the old rail yard and
warehouses into a dense urban neighborhood. However, they worked with PDC,
the Bureau of Planning and other city agencies to make the River District into
what has been described as one of
the most successful redevelopment
efforts in the nation. According to
Pearl District developer
Homer Williams, the area
could have been turned
into a Georgetown-style
neighborhood populated by
townhouses in the $700,000
price range. He claims that
it would have been so prof-
itable that "it would have
been like printing money."
Instead, the developers
negotiated with PDC for
investments in public infrastructure
— as well as tax abatements — that
would make possible a higher density
project with a more urban feel. The
city — in part using TIF dollars —
removed the Lovejoy viaduct, built
the Portland Streetcar, and made
River District: Fast Facts
Created: 1998
Expires: 2020
Home of the
Pearl District,
Portland's new
upscale high-den-
sity neighborhood
carved out of an
underutilized
warehouse and
industrial area.
Acreage: 310
Rank: 8 of 10
Max Indebtedness: $224,780,350 
Rank: 3 of 10
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other investments. In return, the city
gained high-density developments
such as the Brewery Blocks and a
mixed-use urban community in the
former rail yard. Hoyt Street
Properties agreed to build 87 units per
acre once the Lovejoy viaduct was
removed. It raised the density to 109
units per acre once construction on
the streetcar commenced and finally
agreed to 131 units per acre after the
city committed to three parks. In
addition to the added density, Hoyt
Street Properties contributed approxi-
mately $821,000 cash toward the
streetcar and ramp construction, both
considered essential to making those
projects possible. Hoyt Street
Properties also dedicated one city
block for Jamison Square park.
Another example of PDC's ability to
influence the private sector on behalf
of the public’s good was the $2 mil-
lion grant and $6 million loan made to
Pearl District developer Gerding/
Edlen for the Brewery Blocks project,
in part to ensure that 1,300 parking
spaces would be placed underground.2
Despite these public benefits, some
have argued that, in the River District,
PDC could have struck a better deal
with developers and gained more for
the public. According to Shelley
Lorenzen of the League of Women
Voters of Portland, at the time that
PDC was beginning to offer incentives
to encourage higher density, some
developers were already following the
market lead and moving in this direc-
tion without public subsidies.
Affordable housing advocates raised
similar concerns, arguing that PDC's
commitment from private developers
to build low-income housing was
insufficient.3 Nonetheless, the River
District is an example of how PDC
has worked with the private sector to
achieve public benefits through the
use of public and private monies.
In other cases, it has not been the
private sector that initiated develop-
ment, but the Bureau of Planning or
PDC itself that was the instigator.
The original creation of the
Downtown Waterfront Urban Renewal
Area and its recent extension offers a
contrasting view of two ways that
development takes place in our city.
At its inception, the Downtown
Waterfront Urban Renewal Area was
closely tied to the Downtown Plan of
1974, which was intended to revitalize
the central city and make it the retail,
financial, cultural and transportation
hub of the region. This plan included
the creation of Pioneer Courthouse
Square, Tom McCall Waterfront Park,
and Riverplace. Improvements in
transportation were planned to encour-
age retailers to locate downtown and
shoppers to frequent central city busi-
nesses. These efforts were very suc-
cessful and earned Portland a reputa-
tion for taking bold action in planning
and redeveloping its urban core at a
time when most urban centers were
decaying. As the early goals were
attained, new opportunities appeared,
and PDC acted on them. When in
1988 the Central City Plan was adopt-
ed, PDC had already acquired Union
Station and the rail yards, moving in
sync with the Bureau of Planning.
PDC supported the Westside Light
Rail project and expanded support of
downtown housing. After 20 years,
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and with unused allowable debt, PDC and City Council extended the Downtown
Waterfront Urban Renewal Area for 10 years, to 2004. Your committee views the
success of the downtown revitalization effort, which took place from 1974 to
2004, to be largely attributable to a symbiotic relationship between the planning
work of the Bureau of Planning and PDC's work as implementer of the plan.
By contrast, the recent extension of the life of the Downtown Waterfront
Urban Renewal Area appears to be a reversal of roles. By 2004, most of the ele-
ments of the 1974 Downtown Plan had been achieved, but City Council, in a
three to two vote, extended the URA an additional four years, taking advantage of
$80 million in unused debt. The projects used to justify the extension included
relocating fire station No. 1, purchasing land from Multnomah County to build a
new courthouse and creating a Burnside-Couch couplet. Good ideas, perhaps, but
none of them are necessary to achieve Portland's vision of a vital downtown or to
motivate continued private investment in the current real estate development mar-
ket. Supporters of extending the life of the URA cited "unmet needs and oppor-
tunities" as the rationale for the decision.
This may evince PDC's unspoken policy
that, as long as allowable debt remains
unused, URAs will be extended to seize
further opportunities, no matter how suc-
cessful they have already been in achieving
the city's planning goals. While your com-
mittee believes that opportunities cannot
always be predicted and some latitude to
take advantage of them is required, a long-
range vision and agreed-upon goals should
first be in place to ensure that the overall
needs of the community are not sacrificed
to the opportunity of the moment.
Urban planning is essentially a prospec-
tive tool, attempting to assess future needs 
and planning for growth and development in an organized, rather than haphazard,
way. Along with the Bureau of Planning, other public entities are involved in
determining the development of Portland. Metro, for example, is involved in
planning through its Framework Plan and Functional Goals, which include Urban
Growth Management (the Urban Growth Boundary), Regional Transportation
Plans, and Parks and Open Spaces.
Historically, urban planning in Oregon was conducted by local authorities and
carried out primarily through zoning codes, prescribing what activities are permis-
sible in each area of the local jurisdiction. To provide a more comprehensive
structure for planning, the 1973 Oregon Legislature adopted Senate Bill 100, cre-
ating a state Land Conservation and Development Commission (LCDC) to fash-
ion and adopt statewide planning Goals and Guidelines, which LCDC did, effec-
While your committee
believes that opportunities cannot
always be predicted and some lati-
tude to take advantage of them is
required, a long-range vision and
agreed-upon goals should first be
in place to ensure that the overall
needs of the community are not
sacrificed to the opportunity of
the moment.
’
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tive January 1, 1975. In con-
cert with this, Local Goals
and Guidelines
(Comprehensive Plans)
address transportation and
public facilities with maps to
disclose the general land uses
in the jurisdiction. To imple-
ment these guidelines, local
jurisdictions adopt zoning
plans consistent with their
Comprehensive Plan, which
must be approved by LCDC.
It is noteworthy that the
first of the required
statewide goals is citizen
involvement in the planning
process. In Portland, this
means citizens are to be
invited to participate in the
review and amendment of
the comprehensive plan every
five years. This, however, has
not taken place. Since
Portland adopted its
Comprehensive Plan in 1980,
except for some review in
particular areas, the periodic
review has not occurred, pri-
marily, we are told, because
of lack of funding for the
Bureau of Planning, includ-
ing the volunteer Planning Commission. As a result, planning has largely been rel-
egated to zoning and design guidelines, which involve only those proximately
located to the property. This lack of attention to regular updating of the
Comprehensive Plan is one factor contributing to "opportunity" prevailing over
"planning."
Specific activities conducted within urban renewal areas are usually beyond the
reach of the Bureau of Planning. Planning is necessarily involved in the creation
of new or major amendments or extensions of existing urban renewal areas,
which must be approved by City Council. Once such approval occurs, except for
required zone changes, Planning has no formally mandated role in what occurs
within an urban renewal area. Once an urban renewal area is established, PDC —
based primarily on market opportunities frequently with little or no input from
Bureau of Planning 
Commissioner in Charge: Mayor Vera Katz
Director: Gil Kelley
Mission: The Bureau of Planning assists the
people of Portland in achieving a quality
urban environment through comprehensive 
planning that responds to the changing needs
and values of the community.
Operating Budget: $6,015,992
Full-time Employees: 51
Planning Commission
The Portland Planning Commission is an
advisory body composed of nine members
appointed by the mayor and confirmed by
City Council. Planning commissioners serve
without compensation for terms of four
years and elect their own officers annually.
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the Bureau of Planning — determines
what happens within the URA during
its life, typically 20 years plus exten-
sions. While there is an understanding
that the Bureau of Planning should do
the "planning" and PDC should
"implement" those plans, clearly that is
not the way things always happen in
urban renewal areas. As a result, there
have been clear tensions between
Planning and PDC. While Mayor Vera
Katz, who is in charge of the Bureau
of Planning and PDC, has attempted
to achieve greater cooperation
between the two, the vastly greater
resources of PDC make it the Goliath
compared to Planning's David, albeit a
David without a sling.
In August 2004, tension resurfaced
in connection with PDC's plans for
the Lloyd Crossing Catalyst Project
and Sustainable Urban Design Plan,
covering the area between the Oregon
Convention Center and the Lloyd
Center. PDC's project coordinator
was quoted in the Portland Tribune,
"We're looking forward 25 years. This
is a new, cutting-edge way of doing
urban renewal areas. We're trying to
think of ways of identifying this dis-
trict, to brand this district."  The
Portland Tribune reported that PDC's
"aggressive method of defining a mas-
ter plan for the Northeast neighbor-
hood, however, riled some members
of the city's Planning Bureau."  The
article went on to say, "From the com-
munity's perspective, the two agencies'
efforts sometimes create questions
about who is in charge of the plan-
ning and of setting city planning poli-
cy."  Planning Director Gil Kelley
commented, "The city needs to devel-
op these roles and relationships more
clearly."  Other observers have com-
mented that while the two bureaus are
wrangling with each other, large prop-
erty owners are gaining more influence
over decisions and the public appears
to be left out of the process at crucial
stages of the project.
Another factor keeps the Bureau of
Planning in the dark. The develop-
ment of many PDC projects takes
place over long periods of time, some-
time years. Yet the "confidentiality,"
claimed by PDC as necessary to devel-
op a project to fruition, frequently
keeps Planning outside the process
until the project is virtually ready for
adoption. At this point, Planning's
input may be too little or too late to
make a difference.
A case in point is the acquisition of
the DoubleTree Hotel by PDC on
behalf of Portland State University.
In 1995, City Council incorporated the
University District into the Central
City Plan, which essentially suggested
that PSU develop the "no man's land"
consisting of 21 blocks from Market
to the Freeway between Fourth
Avenue and Broadway. Despite this
prospective planning, PSU, as early as
1999, cast a covetous eye on the
DoubleTree Hotel property, although
it was located east of Fourth Avenue
and outside the University District.
Over several years with PDC's help,
eventually in the role of condemna-
tion agent, PSU acquired the
DoubleTree. But, this was not made
public until July 30, 2003, which is
when the Bureau of Planning first
became aware of the intended acquisi-
tion, too late to have any input or
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influence. It was formally approved by PDC in November 2003, despite the
opposition expressed a year earlier by the then PDC Chair, John Russell, because
it "leap-frogged" the University District, which was approved by Planning and
City Council for PSU's expansion. Russell's opposition was not mentioned in the
subsequent PDC public proceedings leading up to approval, as they all took place
after Russell left the Commission.
The lack of attention to planning is further exacerbated by Portland's commis-
sion form of government, where five commissioners, each primarily responsible
for the administrative functions of running different executive departments, lack
significant time to devote to legislative functions.* A full-time legislative body not
only passes laws, it typically engages in long-range planning, as well as ongoing
oversight of the executive and administrative branches of government. This can-
not realistically happen under Portland's current form of government. As a
result, PDC, driven by development opportunities and its ties to developers, has
become Portland's dominant planning organization, particularly in the central city
covered by urban renewal areas. Furthermore, the interests of city commissioners
as heads of bureaus may conflict with what should be disinterested legislative con-
cerns.
Over the course of our two-year study period, your committee has observed
some progress being made in the working relationships between PDC and
Planning. For example, the Planning
Commission and the PDC Commission
held a joint session to focus on improving
coordination. Staff from both organiza-
tions has also told your committee that the
effectiveness of their working relationship
is improving. Still, your committee thinks
that the Bureau of Planning needs a more
clearly defined role, additional resources
and a more prominent voice at the "devel-
opment table."  We also think that
when guided by a publicly supported
plan, PDC is better equipped than the
private sector to drive development
that enhances Portland's livability.
*   In 1961, City Club issued a report recommending replacement of Portland's commission form of 
government with a strong mayor/council form, followed by a subsequently approved report, which 
drafted a proposed implementing charter amendment. Placed on the ballot in 1966 by an initiative 
sponsored by the League of Women Voters, Young Democrats, Young Republicans and Junior 
Chamber of Commerce, the measure was defeated. In 1999, in its report on "Increasing Density in 
Portland," the Club concluded, "our research confirms that the commission form inhibits more 
coordinated and effective management of our city."  Despite the Club, in 2002, rejecting the 
majority report that supported passage of a specific strong mayor/council ballot initiative, it adopted 
the minority report which recommended that the city appoint a "blue ribbon panel" to examine the 
issues. While Mayor Katz initially expressed initial interest in doing that, the idea has not been 
realized.
We also think that when 
guided by a publicly supported
plan, PDC is better equipped than
the private sector to drive devel-
opment that enhances Portland's
livability.
’
28
Tension 2: Flexibility and Speed v. Accountability, Transparency
and Public Involvement
While PDC's relative independence from City Hall contributes to its effective-
ness in partnering with the private sector, your committee questions whether the
public and elected officials have effective or sufficient control over PDC.
Developers and investors — as well as many public officials — interviewed by
your committee insisted that if PDC were more directly tied to the political
process it would be a less effective organization, unable to broker deals. They also
argued that PDC's separation from City Hall allows it to make good judgments
based on the financial merits of proposals rather than on the political calculus of
the moment. PDC's refusal to fund a new baseball stadium, according to former
PDC Commission Chair John Russell, is a good example of how its insulation
from politics enables it to make financially sound decisions that may go against
City Council. Many witnesses also contrasted Portland's success at creating part-
nerships that lead to compact, aesthetically pleasing, transit-oriented urban devel-
opment with the failures of Seattle and Vancouver, Washington to do the same.
Both cities lack an independent urban renewal agency.
Despite the "separation," PDC is ultimately accountable to City Council, which
must approve all urban renewal plans, major amendments, extensions and bond
sales, and to the city commissioner who holds PDC in his or her portfolio. Oregon
law also mandates public involvement in the planning and approval of urban
renewal districts. City Council exercises legislative policy-making at the adoption or
amendment of a URA or upon its extension. It does not vote on individual proj-
ects within URAs. Unless there is a major amendment of the boundaries or dura-
tion of the districts, City Council has almost no official say over the administration
and development of urban renewal areas during their 20 or more year life spans.
The City Council does on occasion use its power to establish and extend the life of
districts or to adopt major boundary amendments to affect specific projects.
Examples of this are the insistence on more affordable housing as a condition of
approval of South Waterfront, the more recent decision to extend the Downtown
Waterfront URA and the proposed amendment of River District to include Old
Town, an idea put forward successfully by the League of Women Voters of
Portland. These are the occasional exercises of planning by City Council acting as
a legislature, but the examples are few and far between when it comes to PDC.
More often, City Council exerts an informal influence rather than direct control
over PDC and its spending priorities. For example, city commissioners often try to
ensure that some TIF money goes to projects that help their bureaus.
Commissioner Dan Saltzman volunteered to your committee that he lobbied PDC
for a children's receiving center as part of the Gateway urban renewal area. He
also convinced City Council to mandate that PDC require all new developments
receiving PDC's financial assistance to incorporate more "earth friendly" designs
and materials. PDC originally resisted both of Saltzman's proposals, but eventual-
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ly agreed. In a meeting between the City Council and the PDC commissioners
over the extension of the Downtown Waterfront district, Commissioner Erik Sten
expressed concern that extending the life of the district would lead to an erosion
of public trust in urban renewal. He supported the extension ultimately because it
included adequate provisions for affordable housing, and the Bureau of Housing
and Community Development is in his portfolio.4 Your committee also heard tes-
timony that PDC is particularly responsive to the agenda of Mayor Katz, who
holds PDC in her portfolio. Mayor Katz, herself, described the Chinese Garden as
a fulfillment of a promise she had made to Bill Naito.
The legal rules governing the relationship between City Council and PDC do
not say much about how they should interact. Former City Commissioner
Gretchen Kafoury and former PDC Executive Director Felicia Trader both
stressed that personal qualities and personal relationships determine the dynamic
between PDC and City Council. Changes in the membership of the City Council
and the leadership of PDC have led to differing levels of independence and coop-
eration. Prior to the 1990s, City Council maintained a relatively hands-off attitude
toward PDC. Partially as a result of the funding crisis brought on by Measure 5,
this changed. After Commissioners Sten and Jim Francesconi were elected and
Felicia Trader took over the directorship of PDC, the two organizations were bet-
ter able to integrate their goals and work more collaboratively. Commissioner
Saltzman concurred that PDC and the City Council have become more collabora-
tive during his time on the Council, noting that he meets monthly with the direc-
tor of PDC and quarterly with its commissioners.
Although much of City Council's influence over PDC is indirect and informal,
taking place behind the scenes, both City Council and PDC seem content with
this arrangement. This informal influence gives City Council a vehicle for financ-
ing projects in which they have a particular interest, but also gives them enough
distance so they don't have to endure criticism if those projects fail or prove
unpopular. At the same time, it preserves much of the independence and discre-
tion that PDC covets. Because of the political insulation of PDC and its ability
to effect large-scale capital improvements, local governments and governmental
agencies, such as the city of Portland, Multnomah County and TriMet, look to
PDC as a major mechanism for securing capital improvements (a new fire station,
a new courthouse, a new light rail line) that might not be approved if submitted
to a vote of the public.
Beyond the oversight limitations of City Council, another challenge in holding
PDC accountable is the Council's difficulty in gaining access to information on
PDC activities. Your committee heard from past and present City Council mem-
bers that obtaining information from PDC is often difficult. One witness sug-
gested that part of the difficulty in communicating with PDC results from the
internal requirement for PDC staff to receive permission from the executive
director before talking to or sharing information with the PDC commissioners
and other agencies. While it may be a common practice for an organization's
leader to be informed about the engagement of staff with external entities, your
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committee believes that PDC staff, at all levels, and PDC's commissioners should
be free to exchange information directly between each other.
Similar complaints came from other sources. The Housing and Community
Development Commission's (HCDC) sixth annual housing evaluation report
released in July 2003 raised a number of issues regarding the PDC's provision of
relevant financial information. Your committee experienced its own frustration
with information provided by PDC. It was often so dense and voluminous as to
be useless to the non-expert or so carefully crafted and digested as to preclude
independent critical assessment. Granted, most organizations generally present
information so as to cast themselves in the most favorable light, and when your
committee pressed for additional information, PDC was forthcoming. It appears
to your committee, however, that PDC's information management systems may
not adequately support the scope and complexity of activities engaged in by PDC,
an organization so multifarious that one PDC staff member referred to it as "the
beast." A number of developers commented that PDC is "bad at collecting and
using data" and lacks clear standards for "appraising, pricing [and] bidding on
property."  Among other things, this lack of clear information has made evaluat-
ing the impact of TIF on other taxing jurisdictions acutely difficult.
The PDC of 2004 is not the same PDC that, in the sixties, tore down the
vibrant but ramshackle neighborhoods that spread across what became the South
Auditorium district, nor the PDC that, in the early seventies, displaced a largely
African-American community, destroying viable affordable housing, in order to
make room for an expansion of Emanuel Hospital. In recent years, PDC has
become more cautious and limited in its use of condemnation, and more sensitive
to community input and approval. Almost every witness that your committee
interviewed — whether they thought the current level of public involvement was
sufficient or not — emphasized PDC's attempt to improve its public involvement
process. Generally, PDC holds multiple meetings each week that are open to the
public and often hosts events at which it actively seeks comments from citizens
and community members. Each urban renewal area manager has four to five
meetings per month with URA constituents. According to PDC executive 
director Don Mazziotti, PDC held 23 public meetings during the 2003-04 budget
process alone. Members of your committee attended a number of PDC's public
meetings. In general, your committee was impressed by the good-faith effort
made to answer questions and solicit opinions. While the format of these meet-
ings was quite variable, they were for the most part lively and open, and the public
was treated with consideration and respect.
Many urban renewal areas now have an Urban Renewal Advisory Committee
(URAC). On March 12, 2003, the PDC Commission adopted Resolution No.
5990 "Establishing Procedures for the Formation and Operation of Urban
Renewal Advisory Committees."  These procedures included some important pro-
cedural policies:
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• "Agency Partners," members representing PDC and other public 
agencies, while they may vote on administrative and procedural 
matters (including election of officers) "should refrain from voting 
on matters intended as feedback to the PDC Board of Commissioners."
• "Conflict of Interest — if a vote is being taken by the URAC on a matter 
that may have a direct financial impact on a member or entity that the 
member represents, he or she shall declare that conflict of interest at the 
outset of discussion. Members who declare such a conflict will be able 
to participate in any discussion, but must abstain from voting."
These procedures were made applicable only to URACs for urban renewal areas
"established by the PDC Board of Commissioners after March 12, 2003."  As all
current urban renewal areas were created before that date, these policies to this date
have no force and effect. Indeed, as if to emphasize this, in January 2004, PDC's
Executive Director issued "Operating Procedures for North Macadam [South
Waterfront] URAC, which contain neither of the prophylactic provisions relating to
staff voting and conflict of interest contained in the March 12 resolution.
The URAC for South Waterfront (formerly North Macadam) presents an inter-
esting case study. South Waterfront is an area with few property owners and virtu-
ally no residents. In creating a URAC for the area, PDC did not seek representa-
tion of various public interests. Rather, as of August 2003, the URAC consisted
of five representatives of property owners in the area, three representative of the
two large developers interested and involved in development in the area, a repre-
sentative of Oregon Health & Science University (OHSU, now a property owner
and developer in the area), one employee of the Bureau of Housing and
Community Development (who was then being replaced), two PDC staff mem-
bers, one representative from the adjacent Corbett Terwilliger Lair Hill
Neighborhood Association and one community "open spaces" advocate. Critics
have claimed that membership on this URAC is scarcely a reasonable cross section
of community interests.
When, on August 7, 2003, this URAC considered the amendment to the South
Waterfront URA to add the DoubleTree property to the area, it acted upon mate-
rials prepared by PDC staff only one week earlier, although PSU's designs on
DoubleTree went back to 1999. At this meeting, a PDC staff member seconded
and voted in favor of the staff recommendation, which passed over the dissent of
the Lair Hill Neighborhood Association representative and one small property
owner. PDC staff members present did not mention the opposition to PSU's
acquisition of the DoubleTree property expressed by PDC's recently resigned
Commission chair, John Russell. While chair of PDC, Russell expressed the opin-
ion that PSU's leapfrogging east of Fourth Avenue violated the city's 1995
University District Plan (designating the north-south corridor along Broadway,
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Sixth and Fifth Avenues for PSU
expansion). When some members
tried to slow down the process for
more information, the representative
of the Zidell property commented
that the URAC’s role was "advisory
only" and unless the URAC acted,
PDC would proceed without its input.
Although two of the members dis-
closed their membership on the PSU
Foundation, they nevertheless voted in
favor, despite PSU's primary interest
in the DoubleTree acquisition. No one
mentioned the March 12 Commission
policies relating to conflict of interest.
Your committee believes it is unac-
ceptable for the PDC Commission to
adopt procedural rules for URACs, yet
render them essentially moot by mak-
ing them applicable only to urban
renewal advisory committees in URAs
not yet established. This vacuum has
left PDC staff free to promulgate
rules of procedure and conduct for
URACs in the 10 currently existing
URAs. This is particularly unsettling
when the PDC Commission's ideas of
appropriate standards of conduct are
not included in the executive director's
subsequently issued rules of proce-
dure and conduct. Your committee
recognizes that procedures might rea-
sonably vary from one URAC to
another. Nevertheless, we
believe all these rules, even
those particular to specific
URACs, should be estab-
lished by the Commission
itself, not by the executive
director. Furthermore,
they should contain appro-
priate provisions for con-
flict of interest and prohib-
it motion making and vot-
ing by staff.
Your committee found that the
perception of PDC's public involve-
ment process varied among stakehold-
ers in urban renewal areas, to a large
extent, depending upon the degree of
conflict over resource allocation. The
River District is an example where
most of the participants have been
relatively content with the process.
PDC did not establish a River District
URAC, but, instead, has cooperated
extensively with the existing Pearl
District Neighborhood Association.
Public involvement in the River
Lents URA: Fast Facts
Created: 1998
Expires: 2015
The Lents URA
was created to
guide the devel-
opment of Lents
as a regional
Town Center as
designated in the
Metro 2040 Plan.
Its location and historic land use
patterns, however, discourage
the type of high density, high
value investments needed to
support major infrastructure
development.
Acreage: 2,472
Rank: 3 of 10
Max indebtedness: $75,000,000
Rank: 8 of 10
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District has been successful for three reasons. First, developers and residents saw
the need early on to work closely with each other. Second, there has been a clear
consensus — shared by developers and residents, and supported by PDC —
about the kind of development desired and their vision for the Pearl District.
Third, the district has produced enough revenue to fund at least some of every
group's wish list. Even in the River District, however, there has been conflict
between PDC and neighborhood residents over how to use TIF revenues. For
example, PDC purposefully created a bulge in the district boundaries to include
the downtown Meier & Frank building so that some of the district's wealth could
be diverted to restoring this historic landmark. "The priorities of [PDC] and the
city government may not match those of the neighborhood," acknowledges PDC
executive director Don Mazziotti. "Do you build a park and let Meier & Frank
stand vacant?"5
Established and operated in a
more carefully structured manner,
URACs
can be the
most
appropriate
vehicle for
effective
public par-
ticipation in
develop-
ment-relat-
ed decision-making. It is not clear,
however, that the public has a
greater level of influence on the actu-
al decisions themselves. In contrast
to the River District, public involve-
ment in Gateway and Lents districts
has been contentious from the start.
Gateway and Lents URAs represent
a change for PDC, which has tradi-
tionally focused on the central city
or light-industrial and commercial
areas such as Central Eastside and
Airport Way. These URAs are on
Portland’s outer eastside and are
surrounded by largely residential areas populated mostly by single-family detached
houses. These projects respond to the criticism that PDC has been too focused
on downtown and has ignored some of the more blighted areas on Portland's
periphery. But in countering these criticisms and directing urban renewal dollars to
other parts of the city, PDC has faced a whole new set of challenges.
Gateway URA: Fast Facts
Created: 2001
Expires: 2022
Gateway, a
designated
Regional
Center, is locat-
ed at the con-
fluence of two
freeways and
two light rail lines. Conflicts
between the planners' vision of a
major transportation hub and resi-
dents' desires to maintain livability
have slowed the completion of an
acceptable development plan.
Acreage: 653
Rank: 5 of 10
Max indebtedness: $164,240,000
Rank: 6 of 10
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Many residents fear that urban
renewal will be used to meet citywide
goals rather than what they perceive to
be their neighborhoods' needs. They
fear that the need to meet regional
density plans will force them to accept
infill and building heights that will
destroy the character of their neigh-
borhoods.6 At the same time, because
these URAs are largely residential and
have relatively little space for large-
scale capital-intensive projects, they
generate very few tax increment dol-
lars. This lack of resources makes
competition for what gets funded even
more intense. Two instances can be
cited of conflicts between PDC and
the local community over use of
funds: A low-income housing project
in Lents that went ahead despite a 16
to 13 vote against it by the Lents
URAC; a Children's Receiving Center
in Gateway that City Commissioner
Saltzman pushed for was approved,
although it was not supported by the
Gateway Program Advisory
Committee nor, initially, by PDC itself.
In both cases, community members
felt PDC ignored their priorities.7
Bonny McKnight, who served on the
Gateway Program Advisory
Committee felt that PDC steered and
eventually took control of the plan-
ning that was coming from the com-
mittee. According to McKnight, PDC
used the committee to give itself
cover, rather than as a vehicle for true
public involvement and input.
Participating in urban renewal advi-
sory committees and speaking at
PDC's public hearings are not the only
ways in which citizens can be heard.
Nor are they necessarily the most
effective way of influencing PDC.
Well-organized groups who have
mobilized around a particular concern
have been able to shape urban renewal
projects by directly lobbying City
Council, although that can only hap-
pen at the adoption, amendment or
extension of a URA. For example,
environmental groups were able to
win a wider greenway for the South
Waterfront project and affordable
housing activists got a commitment
for more low-income housing in later
phases of this same project.
The Office of the Auditor is anoth-
er city agency that could offer some
public oversight of PDC. Each year,
the Auditor produces a number of
performance audits on various govern-
ment functions, as well as an annual
Service Efforts and Accomplishments
Report for the purpose of improving
the public accountability of City gov-
ernment, assisting City Council,
agency management and citizens in
making decisions, and helping improve
the delivery of public services. While
this service report looks at nine city
bureaus, including Planning,
Development Services and Housing
and Community Development, it does
not include PDC. Nor has the auditor
produced any individual reports on
PDC. As far as your committee is
aware, the Auditor has no current
plans to evaluate PDC.
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Tension 3: Return on Investment v. Livability and Quality 
of Life 
It is appropriate to evaluate PDC both as a government and as a business; its
success measured both by the return on its investment and its contribution to
broader community goals. Evaluating it from these different perspectives poses
significant challenges. On one end, public goals are often subjective and difficult
to agree upon. These goals can include creating and preserving green and other
public spaces; promoting density and mixed-use development; fostering alternative
transportation options; supporting the city's affordable housing and mixed income
goals; fostering environmentally sound and sustainable development; and, in gen-
eral, improving Portland's livability. "Livability" is a set of subjective ideas about
the overall character of the urban environment in which people want to work,
recreate and raise their families. On the other end, although PDC is not a busi-
ness, its investments are expected have a positive economic effect through increas-
ing tax revenue, spurring job growth and fostering economic development. The
general consensus among those your committee interviewed is that these are all
desirable goals, and that the public's investment in PDC should, at least in part, be
measured according to it success in achieving them.
Livability and quality of
life are very much in the eye
of the beholder. What
might be considered a desir-
able city environment by one
person or group may not be
by others. Before we can
answer the question of
whether or not PDC has
contributed to the livability
of Portland, we must know
what the city's vision is, how
widely it is held, and how it
was created. The city of
Portland, through its
Planning Commission,
Metro and other public
agencies have set goals for
some of the qualities desired
in Portland's physical, eco-
nomic, social and natural
environments. It would
seem to follow that these
2001 Survey on Urban 
Renewal & PDC
When asked what Portland residents
thought was good about urban renewal, the
three most common answers were:
• It rehabilitates the city and 
neighborhoods (28%)
• It creates an overall better 
community (15%)
• It helps clean up the city, creating 
a better environment with more 
green spaces (14%) 
Other answers included:
• It creates more business (4%) 
• It creates jobs (2%) 
• It increases property values (2%) 
(Source: CFM)
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would be used to measure the performance of PDC within specific urban renewal
districts. Most of the assessments your committee heard, however, were not
based on community-supported goals. They rested, instead, on a much softer and
subjective sense of livability: an overall evaluation of how PDC's projects con-
tributed to the basic "feel" of Portland. When your committee asked witnesses
how we should evaluate the performance of PDC, it was not unusual to hear,
"walk outside and look around."
Most witnesses your committee interviewed spoke favorably of PDC's contri-
bution to the life of the city. This was especially true of witnesses who were con-
nected to local, regional or state government and might be described as members
of the Portland establishment. Even many of the witnesses who were critical of
the way in which PDC conducts business feel that PDC has made Portland a bet-
ter city. When asked for evidence of this contribution, witnesses pointed to spe-
cific developments such as the East Bank Esplanade, Tom McCall Waterfront
Park and the Chinese Garden, or to the vitality and urban feel of particular areas,
such as the downtown or the Pearl District. They pointed to new parks, fountains
and green spaces, new neighborhoods that are integrated with public transporta-
tion and mixed commercial and residential life, and the continuing vitality of
Portland's urban core. Many of these witnesses suggested that these successes and
their contribution to "what makes Portland special" are self-evident, and argued
that no further evidence is needed of their benefit. Even when pushed for hard
evidence of good or bad performance, most witnesses focused on PDC's contri-
bution to the basic feel of Portland. Social critics and students of urban planning
from around the nation have echoed these positive sentiments, praising Portland's
public transit-oriented development, its avoidance of the urban sprawl that has
plagued so many American cities, and its high quality of life, dubbing Portland
"The Capital of Good Planning."8
It is a different question whether this vision for Portland pursued by PDC and
held by the Portland establishment is widely shared by all Portlanders. In 2001
PDC commissioned CFM Research to conduct a survey of opinions about urban
renewal and PDC. The survey shows that the public has a fairly favorable view of
urban renewal, but very little specific knowledge about PDC, how it functions and
what it has done. Forty-seven percent of the respondents had a favorable view of
the agency, while 21 percent were unfavorable. Another 32 percent were not sure
what they thought of it. These numbers place PDC slightly below Metro and
Portland City Council, but above Multnomah County Commission. Sixty-eight
percent of those surveyed had either a very favorable or somewhat favorable
opinion of urban renewal. However, the survey also revealed a lack of specific
knowledge about PDC and its projects. Forty-three percent of those surveyed
could not name or refused to name a specific project completed by PDC. The
most commonly named project — volunteered by 8 percent of the participants
— was "Light rail/MAX/Streetcar," in which PDC played only a subsidiary role.
Seventy percent reported that they had a much more favorable view of urban
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renewal when told that "Tom McCall Waterfront Park, River Place, Pioneer
Courthouse Square and the Oregon Convention Center are examples of Portland
urban renewal projects," suggesting that the general public, much like the witness-
es interviewed by your committee, has the most positive assessment of PDC
when it focuses on these types of high profile developments.9
While this survey addresses the public's perception of PDC and urban renewal,
it does not get at what may be the more pertinent question: whether the more
basic goals of urbanism, density, mixed-used neighborhoods, and public trans-
portation oriented development pursued by PDC are really aspirations shared by
the broader community. Nor do the survey results made public by PDC reveal
whether attitudes towards urban renewal and PDC vary significantly across the
city. The 2002 Citizen Survey published by the Office of the City Auditor offers
a more complex picture of the city and its values. Although this survey does not
ask questions about PDC and urban renewal, nor are the respondents broken
down by whether or not they live within an urban renewal area, it does show that
people living in different parts of Portland see the city, its government, and the
services that it provides somewhat differently. The survey breaks the city into
eight parts — North, Inner
Northeast, Central North-
east, East, Inner Southeast,
Outer Southeast, North-
west/Downtown and South-
west — roughly correspon-
ding to the eight city neigh-
borhood coalitions. (See
selected survey results in
inset at right.)  These figures
do not show a city funda-
mentally divided, but they
should prevent us from
assuming that there is a sin-
gle and unified vision of
how Portland is doing and
where it ought to be going.10
Portland's vision of liv-
ability does have real and
well-documented appeal for
at least one group: well-edu-
cated 25-34 year olds. Since
the year 2000, the Portland
metropolitan area's popula-
tion has grown faster than
the national average. While
the population aged 25-34
2002 Citizen Survey
Conducted by the
Office of the City Auditor
Overall livability of the city was rated by 
residents as good or very good:
NW/Downtown  86%
Inner Northeast  85%
Inner Southeast 82%
Outer Southeast 69%
East   62%
Recent residential development was rated by
residents as doing a good or very good job of
improving their neighborhood:
NW/Downtown  54%
Outer Southeast 37%
East   31%
Recent residential development was rated by
residents as doing a bad or very bad job of
improving their neighborhood:
NW/Downtown  15%
Outer Southeast 21%
East   21%
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has shrunk over the last decade nationally, their numbers have increased in the
Portland area.11 These increases are even more striking given Portland's recent
economic slump with some of the highest unemployment rates in the nation,
proving that it is neither jobs nor economic opportunities that are attracting these
newcomers. Oregon Employment Department economist Art Ayre has even
argued that the magnetism caused by Oregon's high quality of life has magnified
the recent unemployment problem, drawing in young migrants without jobs who
have swelled the ranks of the unemployed.12
Livability is subjective, but this does not mean that livability issues are not real
or not important. It means that the values and standards that Portland uses to
assess livability must be the product of a free and open dialogue, in which all the
constituent parts of the city participate. In the absence of such a conversation,
Portland is in danger of subsidizing the preferences of some at the expense of
others, and effectively disenfranchising parts of our community. PDC can help
make Portland a more livable city if a common vision exists for PDC to follow.
But, it is not PDC's job alone to define this vision. This responsibility also
belongs to and must be shared by City Council, the Bureau of Planning and other
parts of our civic polity. Your committee found that PDC has been successful at
advancing goals held by the mayor and the majority of the city commissioners, as
well as by many of the political actors in Portland. These elected officials should
shoulder, in part, any criticism of the goals pursued by PDC.
When attempting to assess PDC's
impact on Portland's livability, the primary
challenge is the subjectivity of the meas-
ures. In contrast, the challenge of measur-
ing the economic effects of PDC's endeav-
ors lies in the difficulty of determining
which actions create a discernible differ-
ence in the economic health of the city.
The difference in each of these types of
assessment is best illustrated by comparing
the River District with Airport Way. The
River District may be one of the most
publicly recognized of all Portland's urban
renewal areas, but at 309 acres it is the
city's second smallest, easily dwarfed by the
2,780 acres of Airport Way, stretching
along the Columbia River from 82nd
Avenue almost all the way to Portland's
eastern border.13 And this is only the beginning of the difference between these
two districts. If the River District calls to mind images of a quaint streetcar,
upscale boutiques and restaurants, and spacious lofts, Airport Way presents quite a
different picture. Here it is office parks, interchanges and various kinds of com-
When attempting to assess
PDC's impact on Portland's liv-
ability, the primary challenge is
the subjectivity of the measures.
In contrast, the challenge of
measuring the economic effects
of PDC's endeavors lies in the
difficulty of determining which
actions create a discernible differ-
ence in the economic health of
the city.
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mercial space that dominate the land-
scape. If the River District exempli-
fies PDC's
contribu-
tion to
Portland's
new urban-
ism, it is
Airport
Way that was supposed to be its eco-
nomic development powerhouse.
PDC's objective for Airport Way was
to "facilitate development of the
Columbia Corridor as a major
employment center with a diverse
economy" and to "encourage employ-
ers to provide quality job opportuni-
ties to residents of economically dis-
advantaged communities."14
Assessing PDC's performance in
Airport Way would, at first glance,
seem a much simpler task than in the
River District. Here the question is
no longer, "Do you like the streetcar?"
or "Is this a neighborhood that you
want live in or show off to your out-
of-town guests?" but "Has PDC created new jobs, expanded business and
increased the tax base?"  Gauging the success of Airport Way and PDC's other
efforts at economic development, however, turns out to be a surprising challenge.
One of the strong arguments in favor of urban renewal is that tax increment
financing more than pays for itself. TIF funded investments are supposed to
result in higher property values and, in turn, higher property tax revenues — a
given amount of dollars of urban renewal investment will in the long run produce
much more than that amount in increased public revenue in the future. In fact,
PDC does have some numbers supporting such claims, showing that the average
annual growth in the assessed real market value of land in five of their urban
renewal areas has been 6 percent to 14 percent compared to the city's average of
4 percent. According to an outside audit by E. D. Hovee & Co. of these five
urban renewal areas, "these districts contribute[ed] more than twice their fair share
of assessed valuation to the city's tax base." 
But these numbers do not tell the full story. The question everyone — espe-
cially city leaders — should be asking is not simply how much faster these areas
grew than the rest of the city, but how much faster they grew than they would
Airport Way: Fast Facts
Created: 1986
Expires: 2011
The Airport
Way URA was
created to
"facilitate [Portland's] development
as a major employment center with
a diverse economy by attracting
and retaining businesses."  It
played a major role in extending
light rail to the airport but the high
level of anticipated new jobs has
not yet occurred. It is also
Portland’s only URA to have
reached its debt ceiling.
Acreage: 2,780
Rank: 2 of 10
Max indebtedness: $72,638,268
Rank: 9 of 10
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have if there had been no public
investment. It is the difficulty of
addressing this "but for" question that
makes assessment of the true financial
benefits of urban renewal and tax
increment financing so hard to answer
— not just for Portland, but nation-
wide. Urban renewal areas are chosen
not just because of evidence of visible
blight — abandoned and dilapidated
buildings, empty storefronts and
boarded windows — but also for their
development potential. If there were
not strong evidence of this potential,
an urban renewal district would be
considered too risky an investment,
unable to produce the TIF needed to
fund interesting and worthwhile proj-
ects, and it would never get off the
drawing board. According to The
Oregonian, PDC long resisted extend-
ing urban renewal to Northeast Martin
Luther King Jr. Boulevard, an area that
visibly met many of the criteria of
blight, because property values were
so low and the potential for growth so
small.15
To be designated for urban renewal,
an area must be seen as ripe for devel-
opment. Thus, that property values in
the urban renewal districts grow at a
faster rate than the rest of the city is
not much of a surprise, and such rela-
tively high growth rates may have hap-
pened even without the infusion of
TIF dollars. Even in the rapidly devel-
oping River District, with growth rates
as much as 30 percent higher than the
citywide average in 2000-01, it remains
an open question how much of this
growth in value was a product of
PDC's investment and what would
have happened without this input. As
early as 1988, 10 years before the
River District urban renewal area
opened, The Oregonian was reporting
the rapid transformation of the Pearl
District into a burgeoning arts district,
complete with galleries and antique
shops, noting that what was "once
viewed as a slumbering giant of dilapi-
dated warehouses and obsolete loading
docks" was now attracting "the atten-
tion of investors, businesses and arts-
related tenants."16
Even if these high growth-rates
were entirely attributable to PDC, the
true financial benefit to the city as a
whole would still be unknown. Some
of the growth within an urban renewal
district may be at the expense of
development in other parts of the city.
Urban renewal dollars, rather than
simply stimulating development that
otherwise would have never happened,
may instead siphon off development
that would have taken place in a dif-
ferent neighborhood. If this is true,
high growth rates within the urban
renewal areas may, at least in part,
result in lower growth rates for the
rest of the city. If TIF dollars merely
The question everyone —
especially city leaders — should
be asking is not simply how much
faster these areas grew than the
rest of the city, but how much
faster they grew than they would
have if there had been no public
investment.
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move development around, they are
not contributing to the tax base.
While a study of cities in Indiana that
use TIF showed that they had higher
growth rates in median owner-occu-
pied housing values, other researchers
have reached the opposite conclu-
sion.17 Richard Dye and David
Merriman's study of the Chicago met-
ropolitan area found that the use of
TIF increased the rate of property
value growth within the URA in which
it was used, but lowered the rate of
property value growth in other areas
and overall decreased the rate of
property value growth for the entire
metropolitan area.18
The extent to which TIF funded
urban renewal enhances the tax base
and creates new jobs remains an open
question. The "but for" problem
makes an accurate accounting of the
immediate economic benefits of urban
renewal next to impossible. Despite
this and the fact that PDC is not a
business and cannot be evaluated sole-
ly by financial measures, your commit-
tee believes that PDC can and should
do a better job of tracking the finan-
cial implications of urban renewal
projects and communicating those
implications to the affected parties.
For example, in March 2004, City
Council approved a four-year exten-
sion of the Downtown Waterfront
URA. At the same time, Portland’s
public schools are struggling to main-
tain funding to pay teachers' salaries
for the duration of the school year.
During the URA extension decision-
making period, your committee asked
representatives of other taxing juris-
dictions what they thought of the pro-
posed extension. The answer given by
Jim Scherzinger, then superintendent
of Portland Public Schools, was
echoed by others we spoke to who
stated that they weren't given any real
numbers about the financial impact of
the extension but rather a crude pro-
jection that was generally uninforma-
tive. However, PDC did offer to pay
for a consultant to analyze the data, as
it could not provide the analysis itself.
Consequently, Portland Public Schools
chose to remain silent on the issue.
So, is Portland getting its money's
worth for the investment of public
dollars made by PDC on behalf of
the citizenry?  Your committee cannot
answer this question, and no one else
seems to know the answer either —
not by any empirical means at least.
But the question of whether or not
urban renewal pays for itself should
not be confused with the question of
its overall value. Along with jobs and
revenue, urban renewal also con-
tributes to those less quantifiable
goods previously discussed, such as
green space, density and vibrant neigh-
borhoods, goods that must be includ-
ed in any complete and satisfactory
cost-benefit analysis. And so despite
the "soft" nature of the measures,
your committee has thus concluded
that PDC has played a decisive and
positive role in the redevelopment of
downtown and portions of the central
city but it has been less effective at
using the tools of urban renewal in
outlying areas.
B. Economic Development
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PDC's economic development efforts are receiving unprecedented attention.
This attention has been driven by high unemployment rates, which since 2000
have often topped those of any major U.S. city, and by the local debate over
whether Portland has become "unfriendly" to businesses, fueled by the loss of
high-profile corporate headquarters such as Louisiana-Pacific to Nashville,
Tennessee and Columbia Sportswear to Washington County. Calling it an "urban
myth," local leaders, from Mayor Katz to PDC executive director Don Mazziotti,
have vowed to prove Portland's commitment to attracting new jobs and business-
es, and retaining existing ones.19 Yet, despite this consensus on the need to
increase the number of high-paying jobs and help businesses grow, there remains
much uncertainty as to what economic development strategy should be pursued
and who should take the lead in pursuing it, how much public resources should be
dedicated to it, and how success and failure should be measured.
Portland does not lack economic development strategies. Rather, it has too
many of them. The 2003 Portland Small Business Prosperity Strategy report
noted that since 1996 there had been 11 different plans for Portland and the
Portland region that, at least in part, addressed small business development. In
2002 the city, in cooperation with PDC, published the Blue Ribbon Panel Report
on Economic Development, which, with appendices, runs well over 1,000 pages.
The strategy set forth in that report currently guides PDC's economic develop-
ment activities. Your committee found four main principles that appear to steer
PDC's economic development activities.
• Rather than trying to recruit out-of-town companies, PDC 
believes it should focus on retaining the city's existing businesses.
• Rather than looking for the next big thing, PDC is committed to 
helping small, locally owned businesses grow.
• Rather than viewing Portland's economy and economic health 
in isolation, PDC believes it should think about the region and 
regional economic development as a whole.
• PDC desires to identify and support industry clusters that are 
compatible with the region's available resources and strengths.
These principles guide PDC's economic development efforts, but not consis-
tently. Resource constraints, PDC's own organizational complexity and oppor-
tunism all lead PDC periodically to violate these principles.
Whereas some cities emphasize recruiting new businesses, PDC's focus is on
retention and expansion of existing businesses. According to Mazziotti, because
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only 3/10 of 1 percent of U.S. com-
panies relocated in 2003, retention is a
more effective use of dollars than
recruitment. Too many cities compete
for those very few companies that are
actually considering a move.
Furthermore, Mazziotti argued, 80
percent of new jobs in the next
decade will come from companies
already here. As part of this retention
effort, PDC visited 250 local compa-
nies during 2002.
PDC's focus on retention over
recruitment is one of the few places
where financial constraints reinforce
principles. As former PDC Economic
Development Director Marty Harris
noted, "our funding resources for
doing 'true economic development' are
limited."  According to Harris, TIF
accounts for 85 percent of PDC's eco-
nomic development budget, but must
be used only within existing URAs and
only for bricks-and-mortar projects.
As a result, the funds for marketing
the city as a whole or for recruiting a
firm to a part of the city not in a
URA are quite limited. Mayor Katz
declared a fund for retention and
expansion to be a priority as she pre-
pared to leave office and her 2004
budget included $2.35 million dedicat-
ed to recruitment and retention of
businesses.20 This was reduced to
about $900,000, however, after a
police arbitration decision cut into the
budget.21 The one exception to the
emphasis on retention is within urban
renewal areas. "Within a [urban
renewal] district where we need new
businesses," Mazziotti noted, "we defi-
nitely do recruit."  Here, not only are
there more funds available, but also
one of the primary missions of urban
renewal is to attract and generate new
business. Even within these urban
renewal areas, many of the recruited
business are local, either from
Portland or from the Portland metro-
politan region.
Focusing on small businesses,
rather than looking for the next big
thing, would seem to dovetail well
with PDC's policy of business reten-
tion. According to former Portland
Business Alliance director Kim
Kimbrough, 85 percent of new jobs
are generated by businesses with fewer
than 50 employees. The importance
of small businesses for Portland's job
growth is also emphasized in the
Portland Small Business Prosperity
Strategy report, which notes that if
"each of the local businesses with 10
employees or less in the Portland area
were able to add one employee, 39,000
new jobs would be created, effectively
replacing nearly all of the metro area
jobs lost in the past three years."*
The Blue Ribbon report echoed these
sentiments, admonishing the reader to
"remember that small businesses are
the backbone of our economy, and are
where big businesses start."
In order to support its focus on
small business, in 2002, PDC estab-
lished the office of Small Business
Advocate. This position works with
the Small Business Advisory Council
(SBAC), a public-private partnership
that provides a forum for small busi-
nesses to advocate on their behalf.
However despite acknowledging the
importance of small business, PDC
* In March 2003, PDC and the Portland Business Alliance jointly hired a consultant team led by 
Progressive Urban Management Associates to develop an action-oriented Small Business Prosperity 
Strategy.
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appears not always to act in concert with its expressed commitment. As previously
stated, this is in part due to a lack of financial resources —  TIF funds are limited
to urban renewal areas and it is the big projects like South Waterfront that garner
most of the funding and attention. But beyond that, PDC's actions sometimes
give the appearance of an organization contradicting itself. For example, when
word got out that PDC and Home Depot were considering siting a store in the
Central Eastside, concern immediately surfaced regarding the effect the big box
retailer would have on the cluster of small local businesses in the area that sell spe-
cialty hardware and building supply products. In this instance, PDC has been criti-
cized for two things: first for engaging in practices that seemingly undermine its
commitment to local small business and second for having "back room" conversa-
tions with Home Depot out of the public view. In regard to the first critique,
opinions are mixed about Home Depot's effects on the business district. Some
neighboring businesses believe it would be detrimental; others are not sure what
the impact would be and some believe having Home Depot nearby would help. To
its credit, PDC seems to be listening to the local area businesses and has agreed to
conduct a market analysis that focuses on the major retailer's impact on existing
stores and wholesalers, a traffic study, a parking plan and a site plan.
PDC will also launch a competitive proposal process for developers interested
in the five-block Burnside Bridgehead Redevelopment at the east end of the
Burnside Bridge, which Home Depot hopes to anchor. This last action on PDC's
part responds to the second complaint leveled at PDC in this project — lack of
transparency. As we have previously stated, PDC does require some amount of
privacy in order to negotiate deals. In the case of the redevelopment of the
Central Eastside, and specifically the possible addition of Home Depot to the
neighborhood, the sentiments of Mary Roberts, CEO of Rejuvenation Inc., speak
favorably of PDC's efforts. In a May 14, 2004 article from the Portland Tribune,
Roberts said, "I think PDC is really trying to do the right thing. This is an area
that really needs redevelopment, and they really are trying to balance the needs of
the neighborhood."  It remains to be seen whether the activities currently pursued
in this URA will ultimately benefit local area small businesses. Your committee
believes as long as the process is open and transparent, the chances for such bene-
fit are significantly increased.
Another example where PDC's actions seem to collide with its stated desire to
assist local businesses to grow and create jobs involves a homegrown retailer
whose business is almost iconic of the "Portland ethos."  New Seasons Market, a
locally owned small grocery chain has been expanding its retail outlets since its
inception in 1999. One of the company's strategies has been to employ people
from the neighborhoods in which it sites its stores. Throughout 2004, the compa-
ny was engaged in planning and building a store in an economically depressed area
of North Portland. Although this is the type of development PDC states it wants
to encourage, many of its actions made it more difficult for the company to move
through the planning and permitting stages of building its new store. Although
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PDC originally approached New Seasons with the offer of assistance, the compa-
ny eventually declined PDC's "help" and continued on its own as it had originally
intended. It appears to your committee that this may be a case in which PDC's
leadership lost sight of the business owner's needs as well as achieving the big pic-
ture goals for the community.
The third focus for PDC's economic development efforts is regionalism. Your
committee heard from Felicia Trader, a former executive director of PDC, and
current PDC Executive Director Don Mazziotti, as well as a number of PDC
commissioners, that the organization is committed to a regional approach to eco-
nomic development. This commitment to regionalism is evidenced both by
PDC's role in staffing the Regional Economic Development Partners and its
approach to working with businesses and municipalities located outside Portland's
city limits, but within the Portland metropolitan area. PDC makes a practice of
notifying local economic
development agencies before
it recruits businesses from
their jurisdictions into
Portland. PDC's database of
sites for potential develop-
ment by new businesses is
regionwide, and it actively
promotes the region as
whole.
The argument for a
regional economic develop-
ment strategy is threefold.
While businesses largely
ignore the artificial bound-
aries that mark cities off
from each other, they do pay
attention to the differences in
natural resources and labor
pools that define regions. As
Mazziotti noted, "the world
no longer consists of cities
competing against each other,
it is now regions competing."
These regional differences
are augmented by the devel-
opment of industrial clusters
— groups of similar business
units that succeed because of
the proximity of critical sup-
Regional Economic
Development Partners
Members include:
City of Beaverton
City of Fairview
City of Gresham 
City of Happy Valley
City of Hillsboro
City of Sherwood
City of Tigard
City of Tualatin
Clackamas County
Columbia River Economic 
Development Commission
Metro
Multnomah County
Oregon Economic & Community 
Development Commission
PacifiCorp
Port of Portland
Portland Ambassadors
Portland Business Alliance
Portland Development Commission
Portland General Electric
Washington County
Westside Economic Alliance
Worksystems, Inc.
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port services such as technology, schools, and materials suppliers.22 PDC has been
primarily looking at high technology clusters, including wireless services, silicon
technologies and cyber security. Its collaboration with OHSU in South
Waterfront is, in part, an attempt to jumpstart a Portland area biotechnology clus-
ter. Second, focusing on regions allows companies, public agencies and industrial
councils to pool limited resources, share information and develop coherent strate-
gies. It also enables the region to create a distinct identity and concentrate on its
core strengths and key export markets. Third, the commitment to regionalism
also decreases the chance that Portland and adjacent municipalities will engage in
bidding wars for the same company. Your committee believes such "beggar thy
neighbor" strategies work to the detriment of all cities involved.
While PDC's leadership repeatedly emphasizes the importance of a regional
approach to economic development, some of its actions clearly put Portland first,
as demonstrated by its two most highly touted examples of job creation in
Airport Way: Harry's Fresh Foods and Portland Hospital Service Corporation.23
Both are beneficiaries of PDC's "Quality Jobs Program" which provides a subsidy
of about $2,000 for each long-term, well-paying job created within the urban
renewal district. Both had explored moving out of Portland's city limits —
Portland Hospital Service Corporation, for example, had looked at sites in
Vancouver and Wilsonville. But given the nature of these businesses — Harry's
Fresh Foods provides soups and salads for restaurants and groceries and Portland
Hospital Service Corporation performs laundry services for Portland area hospi-
tals — neither firm would have moved out of the Portland metropolitan region.24
Such inconsistency of PDC's actions may result from its very size and complexity.
Despite PDC leadership's sincere belief in regionalism, individual project man-
agers are likely to have a vested interest in putting their urban renewal districts
first, attracting what businesses they can, even at the expense of a Wilsonville or a
Vancouver.
PDC possesses a number of strengths as the administrator of economic devel-
opment programs. First, it is able to supplement the limited city General Fund and
federal economic development dollars with TIF money from the urban renewal dis-
tricts. While this constrains how economic development resources are used, it also
enables some creative use of funds, and makes possible large-scale economic devel-
opment projects such as those underway in South Waterfront and Airport Way.
Second, despite some complaints from local developers and business owners, PDC
is widely considered to have a better understanding of how businesses operate than
other government agencies. While director of the Portland Business Alliance,
Kimbrough expressed great confidence in PDC, believing that it is more "grounded
in market fundamentals" than some of the other local public entities. Third, PDC is,
according to a number of the witnesses your committee interviewed, trusted more
by other local municipalities than City Hall staff and officials, and in a better posi-
tion to work as regional partner. And fourth, PDC plays a crucial role as an infor-
mation clearing house for economic development resources.
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Broader questions remain about how well PDC's programs are integrated with
the overall economic development needs of the region, and about the need for
further work on such issues as workforce training and workforce housing.
Questions also remain about how to best evaluate economic development pro-
grams, especially those aimed at job creation. The same problems that plague the
evaluation of the economic benefits of urban renewal also plague the evaluation
of these programs. It is difficult to distinguish the jobs created by these interven-
tions from what would have happened without them.25 A 2003 report by the
Multnomah County Auditor on the Strategic Investment Program, a program that
allows the county to grant property tax abatements in order to attract new busi-
nesses, highlights this problem. One of the original goals of the audit was to
determine the costs and benefits of the program. This goal was abandoned
because "it would not be feasible to accurately estimate the likelihood that the
business would have located in the County without tax abatement."26
To date, PDC's greatest contributions
to the economic health of the region have
come primarily from its traditional urban
renewal and development projects, and
less from other economic development
programs. It is these projects that con-
tribute most directly to the livability of
this city and the sense of place that
defines Portland. It is also these projects
that provide much of the infrastructure
that enable Portlanders to make the best
use of their talents, energy and entrepre-
neurial drive.
To date, PDC's greatest 
contributions to the economic
health of the region have come
primarily from its traditional
urban renewal and development
projects, and less from other 
economic development programs.
’C. Housing
PDC is the primary agency for implementing Portland's housing goals within
urban renewal areas. Those goals call for increased housing density throughout the
city especially in the central city. PDC's 2004-05 budget allocates over $90 million
to the Housing Division, compared to $83 million for development and $28 mil-
lion for economic development.
Housing targets are set by the Metro 2040 plan, specific City Council actions, if
any, and the city's "No Net Loss" policy that stipulates that urban renewal projects
must not decrease the city's stock of affordable housing in the central city. PDC
has an overall target of producing 20,000 housing units by 2011. Its housing poli-
cy is also guided by the principle that the income range of housing in the central
city should mirror the income distri-
bution of the city as a whole. In addi-
tion, some urban renewal area plans
have Housing Implementation Policies
that set specific goals.
PDC's housing projects include
support for both market rate and low-
income affordable housing. Market
rate housing is subsidized with devel-
opment support such as land assem-
bly, TIF-funded public infrastructure
and tax abatements. Low-income
affordable housing may also receive
direct support in the form of low-
interest loans and grants.
City Club's 2002 report,
"Affordable Housing in Portland,"
identified a lack of adequate funding
as the major obstacle to achieving the
city's low-income housing goals. In
recent years, at the direction of City
Council, PDC has filled some of that
gap and has become a critical partner
with low-income housing developers.
The Housing Evaluation Group, a
subcommittee of the Housing and
Community Development
Commission responsible for evaluating
PDC's use of resources for affordable
housing, reports that, from 1996
through 2002, PDC consistently failed
to meet its low-income housing goals.
However, they also report that PDC
has shown consistent and significant
improvement in their performance.
Indeed, if the trend continues, PDC
may well achieve its low-income hous-
ing goals within a few years.
According to Housing Evaluation
Group, PDC spent only 13.88 percent
of its available funds on housing tar-
geted for 0-30 percent median house-
hold income households during fiscal
year 2002-03, rather than the 35 per-
cent directed by the City Council.
PDC and the Housing Evaluation
Group disagree about whether
"reserved loans" should be included in
this figure. Reserved loans are not
commitments and are therefore specu-
lative. They also allow PDC to count
future projects in a current year. If
reserve loans were counted, the per-
centage would rise to 34.8 percent,
just shy of City Council's goal.
PDC's housing goals sometimes
conflict, and the means by which it
achieves one goal may impede
progress on another. One example is
the conflict between PDC's need to
increase property values to
generate TIF revenues and
the goal of keeping housing
affordable. Raising land
value through development
within URAs raises the cost
of housing thereby increasing
the public subsidy needed to
make housing in the area
affordable. Moreover, policies
to increase the density of
housing in the central city
tend to promote the most
expensive type of housing.
A 2002 City Club Report: "Affordable
Housing In Portland"
Recommendation #4: Focus construction
on special-needs populations and mixed-
income housing.
PDC's growing support of special-needs
housing and experimentation with mixed-
income housing align with this recommenda-
tion. Support for apartments dedicated only
to low-income renters does not.
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TIF as a funding source also limits
PDC's flexibility in siting affordable
housing. TIF must be spent in the
urban renewal areas that generate it,
which concentrates low-income
affordable housing inside URAs. In
2002, City Club recommended that
low-income affordable housing not be
concentrated, but instead be integrated
into neighborhoods throughout the
city and merged into mixed-income
developments. Because PDC can use
TIF to provide financing to low-
income housing developers, the central
city has become a magnet for much of
the multifamily low-income housing
constructed in the past few years.
Thus, REACH, a community develop-
ment corporation that previously
focused on Southeast Portland, is now
developing low-income affordable
housing in the central city. This con-
centration effect can be seen in the
"West End" where several multi-story
low-income apartments were built in
an eight-block area during the 1990s.
TIF funds are also restricted to
capital projects and cannot be used to
fund operating costs such as mainte-
nance or to subsidize rents. City Club
recommended increased funding for
rent subsidies because so called "low-
income affordable housing," built
under current regulations, costs the
same as market rate housing. The
result is that the low-income tenants,
while enjoying the benefits of decent
housing, must often pay well over 30
percent of their income for rent.
Using TIF to spur high-end hous-
ing and to fund low-income affordable
housing has created a middle-income
housing gap in the central city. A
report co-sponsored by PDC and the
Portland Business Alliance warns of a
projected deficit of 1,300 workforce
housing units, defined as housing
affordable to those earning in the 60
percent to 150 percent median house-
hold income range, resulting in longer
commutes and an overburdened trans-
portation infrastructure. According to
the report, workforce housing in the
central city will require an average of
$45,000 in public subsidy per unit and
$61 million in total public support.
City Club's affordable housing
report highlighted the loss of low-
income housing due to gentrification
caused both by market forces and gov-
ernment policy. In recognition of the
growing losses of low-income afford-
able housing in the central city, City
Council adopted the "No Net Loss"
policy requiring PDC to mitigate the
loss of housing caused by its develop-
ment projects in the central city.
Although the losses to non-PDC relat-
ed private development continue, the
"No Net Loss" policy has effectively
offset losses caused by PDC-spon-
sored development in the central city.
However, losses to gentrification due
to urban renewal outside the central
city are increasing. The issue came to
the attention of City Council in July
2004 when occupants of the Gateway
Apartments in the Gateway urban
renewal area complained that due to a
pending commercial development
spurred by the creation of the URA
they were being evicted with little
notice, no assistance and no place to
go. In this case, City Council worked
out an agreement to forestall action
until the tenants could be moved, but
your committee is concerned that the
loss of low-income housing to PDC-
driven development outside of the
central city will only increase. 49
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Despite the conflicts and inefficiencies inherent in using TIF to build afford-
able housing, the shortage of other funding sources continues to make PDC a
favored partner for nonprofit developers and urban renewal the favored vehicle.
For example, City Council in approving the South Waterfront Central District
plan, at the strong urging of housing advocates and other citizen groups, success-
fully pressed PDC for more low-income affordable housing than they had origi-
nally proposed.
Using TIF to subsidize medium- and market-rate housing can be seen as the
city's cost for gaining the livability sought by its citizens and promised in its land
use plans. But building low-income housing in urban renewal areas results in units
that are so expensive that low-income renters cannot afford them unless they are
fortunate enough to claim a scarce rental voucher from the Housing Authority of
Portland. Using TIF to finance affordable housing exacts another cost. When
PDC partners with the Housing Authority of Portland or non-profits such as
Central City Concern, those projects stay off the tax rolls and provide no tax rev-
enue to help pay off the urban renewal bonds. More units, and more affordable
units, can be built for the same cost outside urban renewal areas. City Council
should seek a way to allow some TIF dollars to be used to support low-income
affordable housing in the approximately 85 percent of the city not currently cov-
ered by urban renewal areas, even if it requires authorization from the Oregon
Legislature.
D. Tax Increment Financing (TIF)
Tax increment financing is in many ways a broken tool. Because of tax com-
pression that resulted from Measures 5 and 50, tax increment funding for urban
renewal comes at a cost to other public services such as schools and public safety.
Its complexity makes the exact nature of this cost extremely difficult for public
officials — let alone the general public — to discern, thus limiting public account-
ability. Its funds can only be used in the urban renewal areas from which they
arise, and not in the places where they may be most needed. TIF can no longer —
and should have never been — viewed as "free money" for public projects.
A clean environment, good educational
opportunities, an efficient transportation
system, effective police and fire depart-
ments and a well-maintained water system
are all part of our economic framework.
The value of TIF-funded urban renewal
needs to take into account its cost to these
other parts of the framework in terms of
TIF can no longer — 
and should have never been —
viewed as "free money" for public
projects.
’
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teachers and police officers who were never hired, rivers that were never cleaned,
and roads that were never repaired. As former Multnomah County Commission
Chair Beverly Stein noted in an op-ed piece in The Oregonian, "this plan [the
Interstate Corridor URA] pays for investment in physical infrastructure — like
housing and transportation — at the expense of human needs."27 Until recently,
little attention was given to the cost of tax increment financing to other taxing
jurisdictions. When the economy was booming and property values were soaring,
there seemed to be enough revenue to go around. But a combination of initia-
tive-driven property tax reforms in the 1990s and a slumping economy have dra-
matically changed the picture. Portland's school funding crisis, infamously drama-
tized in a series of Doonesbury cartoons, highlighted this changed reality.
The complexity of TIF, made worse by Measures 5 and 50 and the Shilo Inn
decision, has impeded public conversation about these issues. "I used to tell peo-
ple that figuring out property taxes isn't rocket science," said John Riles,
Multnomah County tax assessor. "Now I tell them it isn't rocket science — it's
much harder." A senior PDC official acknowledged that it took him a year on the
job before he felt he had a good grip on the nuances of TIF. It is extremely diffi-
cult to know how much urban renewal actually costs each of the other taxing
jurisdictions. We do know that in fiscal year 2003-04, $43 million of property
taxes in Portland went to tax increment financing that could have been otherwise
available to other taxing jurisdictions. The amount of property tax dollars going to
urban renewal has steadily increased over the last 10 years, as illustrated in
Appendix E (centerfold).28 Defenders of TIF will argue that this is tax revenue
that would not exist "but for" urban renewal efforts. As previously discussed, this
claim is hard to prove and should be treated with some skepticism. While the
property within the Downtown Waterfront URA is assessed at $843 million, the
frozen base is only $70 million. It is hard to believe that the remaining $773 mil-
lion increment that has built up over the last thirty years is entirely attributable to
urban renewal.29 At least some of the captured tax growth would have likely
occurred without PDC's work. Though not the official position of PDC, Matt
Hennessee, chair of the Portland Development Commission, stated in an inter-
view with your committee that, in order to maintain a healthy regional core, he
would like to ensure that Portland's downtown remain part of an urban renewal
area indefinitely. Doing so would deny significant property tax revenue for other
taxing jurisdictions, including schools, Multnomah County's social service agen-
cies, and the city's General Fund. Stein further noted in her editorial that "We
must make sure information regarding these plans' financial impact is provided
throughout the planning process." 
Measure 50 has also significantly undermined the original rationale for tax
increment financing. TIF was designed to fund projects in urban renewal areas
that were not financially feasible by themselves but also yielded substantial finan-
cial benefits to businesses and properties in surrounding areas. It is the indirect
benefits to the adjacent area that provide the primary justification for using —
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and concentrating — public resources within an urban renewal area. A multi-story
parking garage might not pay for itself, but if we take into account the benefit to
local businesses who see an increase in their number of patrons, it still may be a
financially worthwhile investment.
Prior to Measure 50, TIF was a means for getting those indirect beneficiaries to
contribute to a project that would not otherwise get off the ground. If the new
parking garage benefits local businesses, it should also raise local property values,
and thus, property tax revenue. TIF takes this increase in property tax revenue
and uses it to subsidize developments that are profitable only when their
"spillover" benefits on neighboring properties and businesses are taken into
account. Measure 50 changes this. Property taxes are no longer based on real
market value, but rather on an assessed value that cannot increase by more than 3
percent per year. Therefore, the increase in the value of surrounding properties
produced by something like the parking garage in the above example no longer
yields tax increment dollars. Rather, most of the tax increment is now produced
by the value of new investment in the URA rather than by the increased value of
already existing properties.
In recent years, PDC has focused more on using TIF dollars to leverage private
investment and less on using direct public investments to increase the value of
existing properties. Whether or not this change in emphasis is a result of
Measure 50 is difficult to know. This emphasis on leveraging private investment
may simply reflect national trends, and greater attention to the possibilities of
public-private partnerships. However, the changes Measure 50 made to TIF
appear to reinforce this trend.
Even without the initiative-based changes to the taxation system, TIF is a less
than perfect tool. Urban renewal is supposed to be a catalyst for "blighted" areas
that are stuck in an economic rut. Once public assistance has helped an area
climb out of its rut, public subsidies should be withdrawn, and the area should
continue to grow under its own momentum. But because URAs often last up to
thirty years and the bonds are not paid off
for an even longer time, (54 years for
Downtown Waterfront) the area continues
to benefit from this dedicated funding
stream, even if the area is now prospering.
As a result urban renewal areas that are
already growing rapidly receive more pub-
lic investment than urban renewal districts
that are proceeding slowly. This helps to
explain why there is so much going on in
the relatively wealthy and rapidly growing
River District, while there is a compar-
ative paucity of projects in the less-
affluent Lents area.
As former PDC Chair John
Russell noted, tax increment
financing can be thought of as a
savings plan, a way for the city to
put aside revenue for long-term
investment that would not be oth-
erwise available.
’
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If tax increment financing is a broken tool, it still may be the only tool we
have. Unlike other public funding sources, TIF dollars can be used to stimulate
public-private partnerships. And unlike other public funding sources, it has not yet
dried up. As former PDC Chair John Russell noted, tax increment financing can
be thought of as a savings plan, a way for the city to put aside revenue for long-
term investment that would not be otherwise available. In essence, TIF has
become a mechanism for reserving a portion of property tax revenue for capital
improvements that would have to come from general operating funds or be fund-
ed by general obligation bonds requiring voter approval. Given the general pub-
lic's unwillingness to pass bond and other revenue measures, it is reasonable to
believe that much of PDC's urban renewal work only happened because of TIF.*
Without TIF, projects from the East Bank Esplanade to the Chinese Garden, and
from Interstate MAX to OHSU's expansion into South Waterfront would proba-
bly never have been completed.
E. Portland Family of Funds (PFFH)
In Appendix C, on page 81, a chart depicts the Byzantine structure of the
Portland Family of Funds. By capturing Goldman Sachs New Market Tax Credits
for use in the Armory project and by subsequently obtaining three additional
grants totaling $196.5 million, PFFH certainly has brought funds to Portland that
otherwise would not have been invested in the community. However, the only
specific project committed to date — the Armory renovation — has not been
without controversy.
Willamette Week's cover story on January 7, 2004, titled "The Great White
Hoax," was critical of the Armory project, which is intended to provide a new
home for Portland Center Stage. Willamette Week’s major objections were to the
use of federal tax credits, intended for use in low-income areas, in the Pearl
District, right next to some of the most expensive high-rise condominiums in
Portland. It cited the concern of the League of Women Voters of Portland 
that the funds were not used in the more deserving Old Town. It further com-
plained of the city's potential expenditure of more than $15 million of public
funds should the project fail to meet the overly optimistic economic projections
upon which the project was based, comparing the Armory project to the debt-rid-
den PGE Park. Further objections included purchasing and restoring an old
building compared to building a new facility from scratch; paying too high a price
for the property from the co-owner of the next-door condominium, who at the
time was also the vice chair of the board of directors of Portland Center Stage,
the ultimate lessee and user of the facility; and questions about the difference
*  There have been exceptions. Levies for libraries, parks and children’s services have recently fared 
well, and Multnomah County voters have taxed themselves to give additional support to schools 
and other public services.
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between the Multnomah County assessor's appraisal and a private appraisal of the
property upon which the purchase price was based. The article was extensive and
this summary is not intended to be complete.30
The Oregonian took the other side in praise of the project, both in a column
by Randy Gragg on April 11, 2004 and in an editorial on April 16, 2004. They
argued that the city, at most, might end up some years from now paying $10.6 mil-
lion for a $28 million facility and that a new theater is needed to free up the
Newmark Theater (current home of Portland Center Stage) for a wider variety of
uses. They pointed out that because Old Town is a part of the River District, the
area qualifies as "low-income" for New Market Tax Credit investments. Your
committee believes that both Gragg and The Oregonian's editorial board failed to
include two PDC loans to PFFH totaling $4.6 million in the public's potential
investment exposure, when concluding the city, at worst, might end up paying
$10.6 million for a $28 million facility. We can only speculate whether they might
have reached the same conclusion had they accurately pegged the ultimate public
investment exposure at over $15.2 million rather than $10.6 million.
PDC told your committee that, to avoid any constitutional proscriptions, it
went to great expense and effort to make sure that PDC did not have any control
of or interest in PFFH; that PFFH is not an affiliate or alter ego of PDC, specifi-
cally to avoid running afoul of Article XI, Section 9 of the Oregon Constitution,
which provides:
No county, city, town or other municipal corporation, by vote 
of its citizens, or otherwise, shall become a stockholder in 
any joint company, corporation or association, whatever, or 
raise money for, or loan its credit to, or in aid of, any such 
company, corporation or association.
Because of this constitutional provision, PDC may not invest in a private com-
pany. When PDC lends money to a private developer, it is typically well-secured
and the developer must meet the strict terms of a development agreement fash-
ioned by PDC. The relationship between PDC and the developer are public
records subject to public scrutiny and accountability. On the other hand, when
PFFH lends funds borrowed from PDC to private companies, those transactions
are "private" and the documents evidencing them are not available for public
viewing. Furthermore, PFFH's operational files may not be viewed without
approval of its board of directors and legal counsel.
In our initial interviews with PDC personnel, Portland Family of Funds was
essentially a matter of prospect rather than reality and the information we sought
seemed to come willingly. As your committee's investigation into the relationship
between PDC and PFFH progressed, we encountered greater reluctance on the
part of PDC to share documents related to the Portland Family of Funds. Your
committee is greatly concerned about the close relationship between PDC and
Portland Family of Funds and has set forth in Appendix C the details of the cor-
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porate structure of PFFH and its relationship with PDC in the fullest extent we
have been able to discover them.
From December 2002 to June 2003, then extended to June 30, 2004, PDC and
PFFH operated under a Professional Services Contract under which PDC
employees provided the staff for PFFH, for which PFFH reimbursed PDC out of
loans of approximately $200,000 from PDC to PFFH. This contract contains the
following provision, to our knowledge, the only reference to potential conflicts of
interest:
During the course of this Agreement, the interests of PDC 
and PFFH may diverge at times. The parties agree that in the 
event of a conflict of interest between PFFH and PDC, PDC 
staff shall declare the potential conflict and negotiate and act 
of behalf of PDC. The PFFH Chairman of the Board or his 
delegate will negotiate and act on behalf of PFFH.
In March 2004, after the first specific project using New Market Tax Credits
was formally created and documented most of this staff became employed directly
by PFFH, while Norris Lozano, PFFH's president and CEO, remained an employ-
ee of PDC.*  Key personnel have shifted back and forth between the two entities.
While your committee expresses no legal opinion, nor have we sought one, as
to whether the very close ties between PDC and PFFH might infringe on consti-
tutional proscriptions, we are troubled by the clear entanglements between PDC
and PFFH that seem to mask significant aspects of public business under the
cover of private entities not subject to public scrutiny.
Particularly, we are concerned that PDC, constitutionally prohibited from mak-
ing investments in private entities, by making large loans to PFFH (which
describes itself as an "Investment Bank") for the latter in turn to invest in private
entities, may inappropriately evade the prophylactic constitutional provision. We
are told that, with respect to PFFH funded projects, PDC has the final say; that
such requirement was contained in the applications by PFFH to the U.S. Treasury
for New Market Tax Credits to bolster the credibility of the application, because
of PDC's long track record in successful urban renewal. Yet this very control is
relevant to whether PDC is doing indirectly what it cannot do directly.
It is, of course, difficult not to rejoice that millions of dollars of new invest-
ment have been brought into our city for community development, funds which
otherwise our city would not have had. PDC was undoubtedly wise to foresee
this new source of income — and even correct in encouraging the formation of
the necessary private entities to tap into these available resources. However, PDC
appears to continue to exercise effective control of PFFH, with PFFH's executive
director being an employee of PDC, PDC's executive director being on the board
of PFFH and key personnel being transferred back and forth between the two.
* Although this relationship apparently is still governed by the Professional Services Contract (staffing 
agreement) provided to your committee by PDC, we have not seen a document extending this 
agreement beyond June 30, 2004.
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While the original Personal Services Contract recognized the potential for con-
flicts of interest between PDC and PFFH, and provided a simplistic method to
resolve them, nothing in the new PFFH documents makes any reference to those
possibilities. Furthermore, there is no way for the public to know whether the
nonprofit PFFH, using public funds from PDC, has any conflicts of interest with
its contractees.
Totally apart from issues of conflict of interest, the question of whether the
nature of these financial commitments by both the city and PDC to private cor-
porations is consistent with Oregon's constitutional provisions must carefully be
addressed. To our knowledge, that has not yet been done by any independent
objective outside entity. Unquestionably, such an examination should be made.
EPILOGUE
The city of Portland has a unique and powerful tool in the Portland
Development Commission and, like any tool, its effectiveness is determined by
the hands that guide it. We offer this report, including the following findings,
conclusions and recommendations, as a resource to our city's leaders — newly
elected Mayor Potter and City Council — and most certainly to the Portland
Development Commission itself.
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• As a result of property tax-limitation initiatives, tax
increment financing now competes directly for funds
with the operating budgets of other taxing jurisdictions.
• The ability to use tax increment financing has effec-
tively made PDC the capital improvements department of
the city, allowing taxing jurisdictions (city, county, etc.) to
secure capital improvements they might not otherwise
politically be able to secure.
• The immediate enjoyment of urban renewal projects
in enhancing livability tends to overshadow the need for a
more comprehensive analysis of the sacrifices other tax-
ing jurisdictions make to finance such capital improve-
ments.
1. In essence, tax increment financing has become a
mechanism for reserving a portion of property tax rev-
enue for capital improvements that otherwise would have
to come from general operating funds or be funded by
general obligation bonds requiring voter approval.
2. PDC's involvement through urban renewal has
improved the overall quality and livability of urban devel-
opments over that which would have occurred by the pri-
vate sector alone, but at an unspecified cost to all local
taxing jurisdictions.
In determining whether to create, amend or extend the
life of urban renewal areas, City Council must more care-
fully consider and evaluate the impact tax increment
financing will have on the operating budgets of the city,
Multnomah County, schools and other jurisdictions that
rely on property tax revenue. In addition, City Council
must assure that complete and objective financial-impact
statements are made available to all affected jurisdictions
and the public well in advance of consideration and
approval of urban renewal area action.
I. Tax Increment Financing (TIF) v. the Operating
Budgets of other Taxing Jurisdictions
PART III — FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS 
AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Findings
Conclusions
Recommendation
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II. Opportunism v. Planning
Findings
Conclusions
Recommendation
• Prospective planning by the Bureau of Planning and
the Planning Commission has, by lack of adequate fund-
ing, been subordinated to PDC's greater resources for
pursuing emerging opportunities.
• The Bureau of Planning currently has a role in ini-
tially establishing, making major amendments to, and
extending the life of urban renewal areas. It has had little
influence, however, in the details of development within
an urban renewal area, where development is driven more
by opportunities created by public-private partnerships
than by a public planning process.
1. While openness to unplanned opportunities is nei-
ther bad nor inappropriate, the process of urban develop-
ment would be improved if the Bureau of Planning were
directly involved from the time these opportunities are
first discovered or initiated through their completion.
2. While development opportunities cannot always be
predicted and some latitude to take advantage of them is
required, a long-range vision and agreed-upon goals
should first be in place to ensure that the overall needs of
the community are not sacrificed to the opportunity of
the moment.
3. Urban renewal areas developed in accordance with
pre-existing area plans, such as Downtown Waterfront,
have been more successful than urban renewal areas for
which no such prior plan has been articulated.
4. The mere fact that the Bureau of Planning and
PDC may at times be under the control of the same city
commissioner (recently the mayor) has been insufficient
to ensure clear definition of roles and an appropriate bal-
ance of authority.
Structures and procedures to ensure effective coordi-
nation between the Bureau of Planning and PDC must
be established and thereafter continuously monitored by
City Council. Significant disputes between PDC and the
Bureau of Planning should, if necessary, be resolved
promptly by City Council.
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III. Relationship between PDC and City Council
Findings
Conclusions
Recommendations
• Portland's commission form of government has five
commissioners, most of whose time is spent administer-
ing bureaus and other governmental entities. This leaves
the commissioners, as council members, a very limited
amount of time to devote to legislative matters, such as
long-range planning and economic development. This
contributes significantly to the lack of legislative direction
given to and oversight of PDC and the Bureau of
Planning by our elected leaders.
• Conflicts of interest arise between a city commis-
sioner's desires, as head of a bureau or department, for
particular projects and what might or should be an objec-
tive legislative view. As a result, city commissioners have
secured individual projects helpful to bureaus and depart-
ments in their portfolios, using PDC for political cover.
1. While City Council exercises legislative policymaking
and planning decisions at the adoption of, major amend-
ment to and extension of an urban renewal area, it does
not exercise adequate legislative oversight during the life
of an urban renewal area.
2. Portland's current commission form of government
does not facilitate a sufficient legislative function to
engage in long-range planning and economic develop-
ment policymaking and to exercise ongoing legislative
oversight of those matters.
1. City Council should exercise stronger legislative
oversight of PDC's activities.
2. City Club should establish a committee to study and
report on Portland's form of city government and make
appropriate recommendations.
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IV. PDC’s Governance, Accountability 
and Public Involvement
Findings
Conclusions
• Some of the difficulty in holding PDC accountable
can be attributed to the challenge of establishing quantifi-
able measures with which to judge PDC's effectiveness.
• PDC has improved its process of publicizing its
activities and seeking input from the public, though, at
times, these important steps happen too late in the
process for meaningful public participation.
• In March 2003, PDC commissioners established
"Procedures for the Establishment and Operation of
URACs" that are applicable only to advisory committees
for future urban renewal areas. As all currently opera-
tional urban renewal areas were created prior to that date,
these rules have no force and affect. In the interim,
PDC's executive director has established procedures
materially different from those established by the com-
mission, especially with respect to conflicts of interest
and PDC's influence on urban renewal advisory commit-
tees.
• Currently, PDC staff not only appoints all members
of urban renewal advisory committees, but in some com-
mittees, PDC staff participates as full voting members.
• Management restraints are in place to discourage
PDC commissioners and staff at all levels from commu-
nicating directly with one another.
1. PDC's status as a semi-autonomous governmental
agency increases its overall effectiveness, while creating
concerns about transparency and public accountability.
2. As PDC has taken on a wider scope of public
responsibilities, it has become increasingly complex and
increasingly difficult to hold accountable.
3. While public participation is improving, the public's
ability to influence PDC's activities and decisions remains
spotty.
4. The establishment of urban renewal advisory com-
mittees as a vehicle for public input has not been uni-
formly successful.
5. When PDC's processes are opened to effective pub-
lic participation and genuine opportunity to influence
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Recommendations
policies, the chances for long-term benefits to neighbor-
hoods and the city at large are enhanced.
6. PDC commissioners have failed to adequately
involve themselves directly and responsibly in the over-
sight of procedures applicable to urban renewal advisory
committees, instead leaving those matters to PDC staff.
Current conflict of interest provisions are inadequate and
persons representing diverse public interests and perspec-
tives are insufficiently represented.
1. The city auditor should periodically conduct a per-
formance audit of PDC.
2. PDC commissioners should immediately take
responsibility for fashioning rules and procedures for all
urban renewal advisory committees in existing and future
urban renewal areas. Such rules and procedures should
have clear conflict of interest provisions and should pre-
clude staff from voting and making motions.
3. PDC commissioners should take prompt steps to
ensure that a broad spectrum of public interests is repre-
sented on urban renewal advisory committees.
4. PDC commissioners should protect the right of
PDC staff at all levels and PDC commissioners to freely
and directly exchange information between one another.
V. Portland Family of Funds (PFFH)
Findings
Conclusions
Recommendations
• PDC originally envisioned its role in securing federal
New Market Tax Credits for Portland as that of a precipi-
tator of Portland Family of Funds. It has not limited
itself to that role, however, but has remained very much
entangled with PFFH.
• PDC has made loans to Portland Family of Funds,
which calls itself "an investment bank," without using the
typical security devices it normally uses to secure loans to
private parties. In turn, Portland Family of Funds invests
funds and lends funds to private investors, on terms and
conditions that Portland Family of Funds claims are pri-
vate and not subject to public scrutiny.
• The continuing entanglements between PDC and
Portland Family of Funds seem to mask significant
aspects of public business under the mantle of private
entities not subject to public review.
1. Using federal New Market Tax Credits as a source
of funds for investment in low-income (distressed) cen-
sus tracts located in urban renewal areas is a laudable
objective.
2. PDC's significant control over, staffing of and mak-
ing unsecured loans to the Portland Family of Funds
seem to violate the spirit, if not the letter, of the prohibi-
tions contained in Oregon Constitution, Article XI,
Section 9, which precludes any Oregon city from raising
money for or lending its credit to any private company.
3. Regardless of the constitutionality of this arrange-
ment, the relationship between the two organizations is
inconsistent with good public policy, in that public funds
are funneled into private companies without adequate
public transparency and accountability.
1. City Council should promptly direct the City
Attorney to investigate whether the relationships between
PDC and Portland Family of Funds are legal.
2. Apart from any constitutional issues, City Council,
itself, should determine whether these relationships are
consistent with good public policy and open government.
If it decides they are not, City Council should take imme-
diate steps to remedy the situation.62
VI. Economic Development
Findings
Conclusions
Recommendations
• Activities related to economic development in
Portland are currently administered among many diffuse
organizations.
• PDC is able to leverage tax increment financing for
economic development resulting in more funds being
used for that purpose than would otherwise be available.
However, tax increment financing regulations limits the
use of these funds to 15 percent of the city and further
limits these funds to "bricks and mortar" development.
• PDC has the only substantial public staff in the city
trained for and devoted to economic development.
• Despite the consensus on the need to increase the
number of well-paying jobs and help businesses start and
grow, there is much uncertainty as to what economic
strategy Portland should pursue, who should take the lead
in pursuing it, the amount of public resources that should
be dedicated to it and how success and failure should be
measured.
• PDC is widely considered to have a better under-
standing of how businesses operate than do other local
governmental agencies.
1. PDC's greatest contribution to the economic health
of the city is through its urban renewal activities.
2. PDC's most successful role in regional economic
development is as coordinator and administrator, provid-
ing a single source of information, resources, programs
and opportunities to persons interested in economic
activity in the region.
3. While PDC perhaps should not, in the long run,
remain the economic development agency for the city or
the region, the role it currently plays is critical.
1. City Council should adopt an economic develop-
ment strategy that considers the coordinated use of tax
increment financing and other funds, no matter which
bureaus or agencies administer particular programs and
resources.
2. City Council should clearly state how the city is to
be involved in regional economic development and what
role PDC should play. 63
VII. Housing
Findings
Conclusions
Recommendations
• In support of Portland's land-use goals favoring high-
density infill housing, PDC subsidizes housing in most
urban renewal areas at all income levels.
• Tax increment financing is an important source of
funding for low-income housing, even though it concen-
trates such housing in urban renewal areas.
• At times, urban renewal displaces existing low-income
affordable housing within urban renewal areas that may or
may not be replaced under the city's "No Net Loss" policy.
• A financial conflict exists between building low-income
affordable housing in urban renewal areas and PDC's need
to maximize the tax increment revenues, because non-profit
and government-owned housing are not part of the tax
base.
• Building low-income affordable housing in urban
renewal areas adds to its cost thereby reducing the number
of units that can be built and by concentrating low-income
housing in urban renewal areas. More units and more
affordable units can be built for the same cost outside of
most urban renewal areas.
• Although the exact percentage is disputable, PDC
claims that it spends 20 percent of tax increment financing
revenues on low-income housing in accordance with city
policy.
1. Providing and maintaining a significant stock of low-
income affordable housing should be an important city pri-
ority.
2. Apart from the application of the "No Net Loss" pol-
icy in the central city, concentration of low-income afford-
able housing in urban renewal areas is contrary to
Portland's housing policy.
1. City Council should by formal action require that at
least 20 percent of tax increment financing revenues be
used for low-income affordable housing, and
2. City Council should allow PDC to support low-income
affordable housing outside of urban renewal areas. If necessary,
City Council should seek state legislative authority to do so.
3. City Council should extend the "No Net Loss" policy
to urban renewal areas outside the central city.64
VIII. PDC's Effect on Livability
Findings
Conclusions
Recommendation
• The growth of property values inside urban renewal
areas has been greater than the growth of property values
outside urban renewal areas. However, knowing how much
of this growth would have occurred without PDC's assis-
tance is difficult to determine.
• Urban renewal areas that are primarily residential often
cannot generate a sufficient tax increment (increase in tax-
able value) to make TIF-funded urban renewal feasible.
• Redevelopment of long-established low-density resi-
dential areas, as opposed to warehouse districts, rail yards
and empty industrial land, has generated a high level of
neighborhood resistance.
1. PDC has played a decisive role in the redevelopment
of downtown Portland and other portions of the central
city. Its activities, along with other bold planning initiatives,
such as the transit mall and MAX, have contributed to
Portland's reputation as a livable city.
2. PDC's role in urban renewal in outlying city neighbor-
hoods has been less successful than in the central city, pri-
marily because tax increment financing can be an ineffective
tool for uplifting existing residential areas. Moreover,
neighborhood resistance often works against the goals of
maintaining a specified level of affordable housing and
high-density development.
If the city wishes to conduct urban renewal in existing
residential areas, it must find funding tools in addition to
tax increment financing and develop methods to offset
neighborhood resistance to high-density urbanization.
65
66
IX. Prior City Club Reports
Recommendation City Club's 1971 recommendation that PDC be abol-
ished as an independent autonomous agency and a new city
department be created to undertake urban renewal, should
be replaced by the findings, conclusions and recommenda-
tions of this report.
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2003)
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July 10, 2003 City Council
July 22, 2003 City Council
Aug. 7, 2003 North Macadam Urban Renewal Advisory Committee
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Oct. 15, 2003 PDC Commission
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Oct. 23, 2003 Multnomah County Commission
Nov. 13, 2003 Multnomah County Commission
Nov. 19, 2003 PDC Commission
Nov. 24, 2003 Citywide Land Use Planning
Nov. 28, 2003 North Macadam Urban Renewal Advisory Committee
Dec. 2, 2003 Multnomah County Commission
Dec. 4, 2003 North Macadam Urban Renewal Advisory Committee
Dec. 10, 2003 PDC-City Council Quarterly Joint Work Session
Jan. 15, 2004 North Macadam Urban Renewal Advisory Committee
Jan. 20, 2004 Pearl District Land Use 
Jan. 21, 2004 Gateway Urban Renewal Advisory Committee
Jan. 26, 2004 Downtown Community Association
Jan. 28, 2004 PDC Budget Outreach: All Urban Renewal Areas
Jan. 29, 2004 Portland Business Alliance Sub-committee
Feb. 25, 2004 PDC-City Council Quarterly Joint Work Session
May 20, 2004 PDC-Planning Commission Joint Work Session
July 12, 2004 Central Eastside Industrial Area Urban Renewal Advisory Committee
July 13, 2004 Planning Commission
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PFFH Corporate Structure 
The umbrella Portland Family of Funds Holding, Inc. (PFFH) was incorporated
under ORS Chapter 65 on August 27, 2002, as a "Mutual Benefit" nonprofit corpora-
tion. It has no members. The board of directors (no number or method of selection
is specified in these articles) is given authority to adopt, amend and repeal Bylaws if
"approved in writing by the PDC."  PFFH's initial board of directors was entirely
appointed by the executive director of PDC. The Articles further provided that, on
dissolution, any assets remaining after payment of liabilities "should be distributed by
the Board of Directors of PDC" or alternatively "to such other nonprofit corporation
designated by PDC. The Board of Directors was given authority to adopt and amend
Bylaws, "provided that such alteration, amendment, repeal or adoption of any new
Bylaw is approved in writing by the PDC."
Under the Oregon Nonprofit Corporations Act (ORS Chapter 65), an Oregon
nonprofit corporation may be formed as a "Religious corporation" (for religious pur-
poses), a "Public benefit corporation" (for a public or charitable purpose) or a "Mutual
benefit corporation (which is not a religious or public benefit corporation). According
to the Department of Justice, "Mutual benefit nonprofit corporations are typically
organized for the benefit of the organization's membership. Examples include social
clubs, business leagues, and veterans groups."  Public benefit corporations must regis-
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ter with the Department of Justice, while Mutual benefit corporations need not. In
discussions with PDC's Norris Lozano, he described PFFH more as a Public benefit
corporation than a Mutual benefit corporation. Also, PFFH describes itself as a
"Community Investment BankTM", although, according to Lozano, it is not subject to
the same laws that regulate most banks.
The original Bylaws, adopted simultaneously with the original Articles, provide that
the Board shall consist of one to 11 individuals and further provide:
• PDC shall nominate and select the initial Directors of the Corporation 
• PDC shall have full authority to remove any or all directors at any time 
without cause or for cause.
• All vacancies in the Board of Directors shall be filled by appointment 
made by the Board of Directors (or PDC if there are no Directors) 
from a slate selected by PDC.
• PFFH is prohibited from taking "any action which would result in 
PDC's failure to qualify as the 'Controlling Entity' of Portland New 
Markets Fund I, LLC with respect to the New Markets Tax Credit 
program *** without the prior written consent of PDC." 
• PDC shall have third party approval authority ("PDC Approval") with 
respect to the Corporation as set forth in these bylaws.
• PDC shall have sole discretion with respect to all matters requiring PDC 
approval under the Limitation of Powers of the Board of Directors 
under Article IV of these bylaws.
• Article IV provides that the PFFH Board of Directors may not,
without PDC approval:
1. adopt any change to the bylaws
2. appoint or remove Directors 
3. appoint or remove the President
4. form any subsidiary or accept appointment as manager of
a limited liability company.
These initial Bylaws were Amended and Restated on December 18, 2002, signed by
Donald F. Mazziotti as Secretary. While similar to the original, they increased the
number of directors to 12, provided for a Nominating and Governance Committee to
fill vacancies in the Board and allowed the Board to elect the Chief Executive
Officer/President and Secretary. The limitations on board action and the require-
ments for PDC approval, contained in Article IV of original Bylaws remained.
Your committee was furnished with a copy of unsigned "Third Amended and
Restated Bylaws," dated in 2003. They provided for Directors to be selected by the
existing Board of Directors from a "slate selected by the Nominating and Governance
Committee" appointed by the Board, which makes this a self-perpetuating board with
no outside controls. It provides, however, that at least one seat "shall be reserved for
the Director of PDC so long as the Corporation shall have an outstanding debt to
PDC."  We have been informed that Mazziotti sits on the board of PFFH, consistent
with the fact that PFFH is, and may be expected for many years, to be indebted to
PDC. In these Third Bylaws, the paragraph IV requirement for PDC approval for
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certain board actions has been deleted. Because your committee has been told that
the internal documents of PFFH are not public records, we were unable to review the
current version of the Bylaws before completing our report.
On May 5, 2004, a new attorney for PFFH filed minimal First Amended and
Restated Articles of Incorporation, which deleted all references to PDC and omitted
all reference to directors and officers, leaving all such matters for the non-public
record Bylaws. It is reasonable to assume that the new attorney for PFFH prepared
and PFFH adopted restated Bylaws which continue the self-perpetuating governance
structure and are considered by PFFH to be non-public records.
The Armory Project Legal and Financial Structure
On October 3, 2003, PFFH formed a Delaware LLC called the "Portland New
Markets Investment Fund II LLC" (PNMIF II) of which PFFH is the "managing
member," which became the "investment fund" for this project and into which the $28
million of loans and investments are funneled. In turn, on March 30, 2004, when
most of legal documents for the Armory project were dated and executed, PFFH,
PNMIF II, and a Delaware LLC called GS [for Goldman Sachs] New Market Funds,
LLC (GSNMF), became members of a previously existing Delaware LLC, replacing a
former member. This newly constituted LLC became the Community Development
Entity (CDE), authorized to receive and use the New Market Tax Credit investments
for the Armory project.
The business and affairs of this new CDE are to be managed "in part by GSNMF,
as "managing member" and in part by PFFH as "administrative member."  More
specifically, while the managing member has "the power to exercise a controlling influ-
ence over the management policies and investment decisions of the CDE, PFFH, as
"administrative member," has "the power and authority, on behalf of the [managing
member] to conduct and administer the operations of the CDE, and to exercise on
behalf of [the CDE] the powers granted to a limited liability company by the Act" to
ensure that the CDE complies with applicable laws and program requirements.
To own the Armory property itself, PFFH formed an additional Delaware LLC
known as the "Portland Historic Rehabilitation Fund I, LLC (PHRF I) qualified to use
Historic Tax Credits to save and restore historic building. On March 30, 2004, PFFH
withdrew as "managing member" to be replaced by a new "managing member" called
Armory Property Manager LLC (APM). APM was another Delaware LLC in which
PFFH, under an "Operating Agreement," made a capital contribution to APM of
$100,000, and became its sole and managing member. Also on March 31, 2004, PFFH
executed a "Guaranty of Construction Completion" in favor of GSPNMF, US
Bancorp Community Development Corporation and Armory Real Estate Holdings,
LLC, a Delaware LLC.
In many of the documents executed on March 30 and 31, 2004, Julie Van Noy
Cody signed in various capacities: as Senior Vice-President of PFFH, as the initial
investor member of PNMIF II, as Senior Vice-President of PNMIF II and as Senior
Vice-President of PFFH on behalf of APM. We were advised that at the time she
was on the payroll of PFFH, but since has been hired by PDC where she serves as
PDC's "liaison" with PFFH.
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A chart of the Portland Armory Financial Structure, the Portland Family of Funds, A
Community Investment Bank™, appears above.
APPENDIX D: URBAN RENEWAL AREA KEY FACTS 
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Closed Urban Renewal Areas Start Date1 End Date2
South Auditorium July 1958 June 1966
Albina Neighborhood Improvement Plan July 1964 June 1974
Portland State Urban Renewal6 July 1965 June 1975
Sabin July 1971 June 1975
Emanuel Hospital July 1970 June 1978
Northwest Front Avenue Industrial July 1978 June 1992
St. John's Project July 1979 June 1996
Current Urban Renewal Areas
Central Eastside June 1986 Aug. 2006
Downtown Waterfront (extended from June 1974 April 2008
April 1994 to April 2004 and again from 
April 2004 to April 2008)
South Park Blocks June 1985 July 2008
Airport Way June 1986 May 2011
Oregon Convention Center June 1989 June 2013
Lents Town Center June 1998 Oct. 2015
River District Sept. 1998 Oct. 2020
South Waterfront/North Macadam June 1999 June 2020
Interstate Corridor June 2000 June 2021
Gateway June 2001 June 2022
August 2004
1 If actual date was not available, July 1 was assumed.
2 Date the urban renewal area is currently scheduled to expire.
3 Assumes debt could be issued up to the date of expiration. Does not account
for maximum indebtedness or carrying capacity.
4 Dependent upon the date for the last debt issuance. Long term debt is normally
issued with a 20-year term. Does not account for when maximum indebted-
ness may be reached or when debt carrying capacity of the URA is reached.
5 Prior to Measures 47 and 50, urban renewal areas were not required to establish
an amount for maximum indebtedness.
6 Project was completed without tax increment financing. Sources of funds
included HUD grants and funds from the State Board of Higher Education.
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June 1966 June 1986 28
June 1974 June 1994 30
June 1975 June 1995 30
June 1975 June 1995 24
June 1978 June 1998 28
June 1992 Feb. 1992 14
June 1996 June 1996 17
Aug. 2006 Aug. 2026 40 $66,274,000 $30,440,000 $35,834,000 
April 2008 April 2028 54 $165,000,000 $90,450,000 $74,550,000 
July 2008 July 2028 43 $143,619,000 $58,280,000 $85,339,000 
May 2011 June 2031 45 $72,638,268 $72,638,268 
June 2013 June 2033 45 $167,511,000 $68,065,000 $99,446,000 
Oct. 2015 Oct. 2035 37 $75,000,000 $19,030,000 $55,970,000 
June 2018 June 2038 40 $224,780,350 $81,690,000 $143,090,350 
June 2020 June 2040 41 $288,562,000 $5,455,000 $283,107,000 
June 2021 June 2041 41 $335,000,000 $5,800,000 $329,200,000 
June 2022 June 2042 41 $164,240,000 $2,565,000 $161,675,000 
TOTAL $1,702,624,618 $434,413,268 $1,268,211,350 
Last
Possible
Date for
Debt
Issuance3
Last
Probable
Date for
Debt
Payment4
Years From
Start to
Final Debt
Repayment
Maximum
Indebtedness5
Debt Issued  
Through 
June 30,
    2004      
Debt 
Capacity as 
of June 30,
     2004     
TOTAL — ALL URBAN RENEWAL AREAS COMBINED1
Base Frozen Increased Total Plan
Tax Year Value*     Value*   Area Value*
1974-75 123,922,901 7,694,168 131,617,069 
1975-76 123,183,813 29,802,206 152,986,019 
1976-77 121,506,894 46,930,840 168,437,734 
1977-78 119,829,975 83,666,992 203,496,967
1978-79 154,748,067 135,312,665 290,060,732 
1979-80 152,105,119 183,400,407 335,505,526
1980-81 135,462,740 189,489,487 324,952,227 
1981-82 133,618,454 285,979,556 419,598,010
1982-83 134,729,991 319,786,958 454,516,949 
1983-84 143,914,254 352,510,989 496,425,243 
1984-85 151,990,034 401,313,233 553,303,267 
1985-86 560,614,463 466,318,798 1,026,933,261 
1986-87 560,614,463 569,891,916 1,130,506,379
1987-88 977,748,286 476,025,156 1,453,773,442
1988-89 990,030,536 533,704,064 1,523,734,600
1989-90 1,277,599,086 594,118,104 1,871,717,190
1990-91 1,264,985,268 674,292,824 1,939,278,092
1991-92 1,264,985,268 928,096,857 2,193,082,125
1992-93 1,304,460,498 1,065,141,015 2,369,601,513 
1993-94 1,304,460,498 1,074,359,219 2,378,819,717
1994-95 1,304,460,498 1,182,072,766 2,486,533,264
1995-96 1,304,460,498 1,447,255,457 2,751,715,955
1996-97 1,300,775,376 1,777,107,584 3,077,882,960
1997-98 1,039,017,376 1,764,211,024 2,803,228,400
1998-99 1,039,017,376 1,988,739,587 3,027,756,963
1999-00 2,034,105,957 2,272,303,536 4,306,409,493
2000-01 2,210,587,004 2,744,897,159 4,955,484,163
2001-02 3,230,381,979 3,258,039,979 6,488,421,958
2002-03 3,537,358,300 3,557,116,101 7,094,474,401
2003-04 3,537,358,300 3,981,438,083 7,338,345,416
* Beginning in 1997-98, as a result of Measure 50, Base Frozen Values, Increased
Value and Total Plan Area Value were recalculated to reflect assessed rather
than real market values. Maximum Authority was established based on a pre-
Measure 50 authority.
Measure 50 allowed an existing urban renewal plan area to impose a citywide
special levy. The Actual Taxes Imposed amount shown for the special levy is
the pro rata share of the total levy imposed by all plan areas.
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Maximum Actual Taxes Loss Due
Authority*    Imposed   Measure 5
213,821
853,833
1,352,547
2,255,662
3,290,804
3,752,37
3,806,844
6,528,914
8,029,850
8,580,118
9,856,253
11,975,067
15,740,415
14,091,197
16,524,557
19,588,584
22,337,683
17,666,269 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
2,500,000 1,296
18,093,968 21,810
56,376,914 35,307,727 4,547
63,479,803 35,867,922 1,393,888
69,293,316 36,423,173 1,312,766
77,729,082 42,017,910 2,026,672
86,921,588 47,801,372 2,431,02
89,575,627 53,565,012 2,474,403
91,189,289 57,248,066 3,780,311
Total All 
Areas Combined2 495,269,941
ND TAXES
1 Includes totals for all urban renewal plan areas in existence in each year reported.
Three of the plans included have been closed: South Auditorium 1958-1988,
Northwest Front Avenue Industrial 1978-1992 and St. John’s Riverfront
1981-1996.
2 New plan areas may only take taxes generated by the increased value. They do
not have a maximum authority or a special levy.
Source: Tax Supervising and Conservation Commission 2003-04 Annual Report
APPENDIX F: SPREADSHEET: PDC’S ACTUAL REVENUES AND 
REVENUES FY1988-89 FY1989-90 FY1990-91 
Beginning Balance $46,065,043 $50,593,706 $39,593,301 
Cash Transfer In $446,431 $10,315,156 $-   
Federal & Other Grants $-   $16,991,685 $2,038,041 
City General Fund $25,000 $-   $-   
Housing Investment Fund $-   $-   $-   
Line of Credit $-   $-   $1,635,760 
Loans from Other Funds $-   $-   $-   
Private Funding $-   $131,990 $-   
Contract Services $992,968 $-   $-   
Program Income $152,589 $-   $8,196,536 
Misc Revenue $217,001 $-   $3,814,803 
Service Reimbursements $7,694,565 $-   $-   
Service Reimb.-Dept OH $-   $-   $1,358,319 
Bonded Debt Funds $-   $5,122,665 $-   
Tax Increment Debt 
Proceeds $-   $52,239,066 $30,053,575 
Total Revenues $55,593,597 $135,394,268 $86,690,335 
EXPENDITURES
Development $19,187,257 $17,272,906 $13,697,216 
Economic Development $2,416,396 $1,909,038 $2,093,733 
Housing $11,202,047 $14,514,914 $12,655,470 
Operating Dept. Subtot. $32,805,700 $33,696,858 $28,446,419 
Executive $-   $-   $-   
Resource Development $-   $-   $-   
Finance $575,351 $1,018,662 $588,607 
Support Services $3,921,830 $4,396,603 $2,700,798 
Professional Services $-   $-   $-   
Debt Service $1,550,789 $1,317,352 $1,821,610 
Cash Transfers Out $-   $1,430,946 $-   
Loans to Other Funds $-   $-   $-   
All Other Subtotal $6,047,970 $8,163,563 $5,111,015 
Total Expenditures $38,853,670 $41,860,421 $33,557,434 
URBAN RENEWAL AREA
Airport Way $3,696,415 $6,634,723 $22,726,023 
Central Eastside $344,906 $597,898 $5,572,284 
Convention Center $377,584 $904,706 $1,610,374 
St. John’s Project $9,650 $99,904 $392,736 
NW Front Ave Industrial $273,388 $294,617 $191,355 
South Park Blocks $4,768,123 $6,422,395 $9,853,911 
Downtown Waterfront $33,145,507 $31,840,753 $28,140,123 
South Auditorium $70,222 $61,003 $119,446 
Lents Town Center $-   $-   $-   
River District $-   $-   $-   
Interstate Corridor $-   $-   $-   
S. Waterfrnt (N. Macadam) $-   $-   $-   
Gateway Regional Center $-   $-   $-   
All Urban Renewal Areas $42,685,795 $46,855,999 $68,606,252 
 EXPENDITURES; EXPENDITURES BY URBAN RENEWAL AREA (FY 88
FY1991-92 FY1992-93 FY1993-94 FY1994-95 FY1995-96 
$52,550,713 $52,239,141 $48,032,019 $38,942,680 $39,415,948 
$-   $17,866,357 $15,796,168 $15,301,676 $4,381,498 
$11,077,850 $4,932,128 $11,377,197 $17,100,346 $9,506,674 
$-   $633,446 $2,602,151 $610,354 $-   
$-   $-   $-   $-   $-   
$-   $-   $-   $-   $-   
$-   $-   $-   $-   $4,381,498 
$870,677 $-   $-   $1,346,720 $1,849,300 
$-   $-   $-   $-   $-   
$-   $3,086,753 $2,463,035 $13,136,278 $21,490,444 
$-   $23,756,443 $18,986,669 $-   $-   
$-   $9,141,028 $6,461,871 $-   $3,837,603 
$-   $-   $-   $-   $-   
$-   $-   $-   $-   $-   
$23,659,312 $-   $-   $-   $-   
$88,158,552 $111,655,296 $105,719,110 $86,438,054 $84,862,965 
$13,545,174 $11,317,134 $8,270,368 $8,289,313 $4,280,767 
$2,343,235 $2,266,461 $2,858,582 $4,700,481 $4,799,213 
$14,034,159 $13,448,176 $27,319,960 $13,514,880 $12,414,894 
$29,922,568 $27,031,771 $38,448,910 $26,504,674 $21,494,874 
$-   $1,136,806 $864,889 $772,479 $3,116,537 
$-   $-   $-   $-   $-   
$969,404 $-   $-   $-   $3,735,804 
$3,732,048 $-   $-   $-   $-   
$-   $6,161,122 $11,297,236 $7,041,528 $-   
$983,819 $-   $-   $-   $1,478,797 
$-   $-   $-   $-   $-   
$-   $-   $-   $-   $-   
$5,685,271 $7,297,928 $12,162,125 $7,814,007 $8,331,138 
$35,607,839 $34,329,699 $50,611,035 $34,318,681 $29,826,012 
$14,072,747 $11,225,058 $8,992,826 $2,357,554 $901,618 
$8,453,746 $2,048,191 $756,009 $938,934 $390,680 
$5,316,284 $4,810,362 $4,334,654 $4,514,607 $4,496,855 
$4,004,609 $3,939,092 $3,878,863 $3,817,160 $983,263 
$136,457 $81,063 $-   $-   $-   
$13,005,104 $10,760,643 $9,906,152 $4,013,429 $79,343 
$18,689,932 $22,136,173 $15,248,174 $12,989,173 $12,801,142 
$124,909 $16,233 $25,182 $869,107 $872,143 
$-   $-   $-   $-   $-   
$-   $-   $-   $-   $-   
$-   $-   $-   $-   $-   
$-   $-   $-   $-   $-   
$-   $-   $-   $-   $-   
$63,803,788 $55,016,815 $43,141,860 $29,499,964 $20,525,044 
8-89 THROUGH FY 03-04)
FY1996-97 FY1997-98 FY1998-99 FY1999-00 FY2000-01  
$43,341,759 $49,538,083 $72,914,698 $98,058,750 $123,053,252 
$10,000 $2,900,816 $2,472,000 $157,968 $693,634 
$8,887,893 $5,801,712 $12,734,119 $6,032,033 $8,851,658 
$4,798,159 $4,743,434 $4,036,430 $7,407,902 $1,964,657 
$8,161,322 $(1,141,951) $4,507,462 $5,552,834 $-   
$-   $-   $-   $-   $8,423,946 
$6,188,477 $1,806,979 $-   $525,000 $2,100,000 
$3,354,085 $2,887,868 $1,477,437 $143,984 $2,059,267 
$-   $-   $-   $-   $-   
$19,504,387 $27,469,358 $20,633,791 $25,347,867 $29,145,003 
$-   $-   $-   $-   $-   
$3,412,052 $3,760,456 $3,594,772 $6,171,057 $6,358,023 
$-   $-   $-   $-   $-   
$-   $-   $-   $-   $-   
$8,393,080 $26,043,461 $70,641,224 $69,560,659 $151,330,444 
$106,051,214 $123,810,216 $193,011,933 $218,958,054 $333,979,884 
$10,635,351 $10,894,429 $24,744,316 $36,768,783 $56,815,415 
$9,198,716 $8,731,674 $37,711,570 $30,575,043 $8,728,357 
$28,652,307 $25,262,171 $43,239,219 $32,630,382 $32,268,636 
$48,486,374 $44,888,274 $105,695,105 $99,974,208 $97,812,408 
$2,599,723 $2,205,526 $2,280,464 $2,587,522 $4,934,303 
$-   $-   $-   $-   $-   
$4,124,694 $5,178,446 $2,392,429 $4,494,172 $2,749,153 
$248,791 $538,378 $124,500 $1,022,319 $-   
$-   $-   $-   $-   $-   
$248,791 $-   $2,619,169 $2,179,316 $2,920,991 
$-   $67,107 $2,000,000 $-   $693,634 
$-   $-   $-   $-   $2,100,000 
$7,221,999 $7,989,457 $9,416,562 $10,283,329 $13,398,081 
$55,708,373 $52,877,731 $115,111,667 $110,257,537 $111,210,489 
$593,633 $6,569,006 $38,970,726 $40,722,563 $31,259,106 
$3,001,525 $5,476,513 $8,707,898 $10,250,280 $16,320,901 
$6,466,233 $8,046,527 $3,105,527 $12,038,390 $49,182,435 
$-   $-   $-   $-   $-   
$-   $-   $-   $-   $-   
$8,749,873 $15,004,506 $25,312,688 $19,911,197 $43,706,261 
$15,351,921 $19,450,606 $27,917,733 $35,821,749 $57,239,600 
$903,029 $903,028 $-   $-   $-   
$-   $-   $-   $3,511,147 $5,997,473 
$-   $-   $-   $2,874,553 $18,563,263 
$-   $-   $-   $-   $130,076 
$-   $-   $-   $2,515,457 $4,560,005 
$-   $-   $-   $-   $-   
$35,066,214 $55,450,186 $104,014,572 $127,645,336 $226,959,120 
Source: Portland Development Commission
Record of Actual Revenues and Expenses by Fiscal Ye
Total % Average
All All Per
FY2001-02  FY2002-03  FY2003-04  Years    Years Year    
$228,455,982 $132,050,672 $147,190,129 
$2,985,935 $727,944 $16,609,508 $90,665,091 7.11% $5,666,568 
$7,676,203 $3,648,487 $9,759,584 $136,415,610 10.70% $8,525,976 
$1,258,468 $1,049,956 $-   $29,129,957 2.28% $1,820,622 
$-   $-   $-   $17,079,667 1.34% $1,067,479 
$4,416,000 $629,732 $4,130,621 $19,236,059 1.51% $1,202,254 
$-   $-   $-   $15,001,954 1.18% $937,622 
$2,572,350 $683,157 $-   $17,376,835 1.36% $1,086,052 
$-   $-   $-   $992,968 0.08% $62,061 
$27,015,617 $25,505,051 $14,728,498 $237,875,207 18.65% $14,867,200 
$-   $-   $17,946,365 $64,721,281 5.07% $4,045,080 
$8,434,673 $11,305,170 $1,629,207 $71,800,477 5.63% $4,487,530 
$-   $-   $-   $1,358,319 0.11% $84,895 
$-   $-   $-   $5,122,665 0.40% $320,167 
$35,346,281 $64,390,903 $36,906,755 $568,564,760 44.58% $35,535,298 
$318,161,509 $239,991,072 $248,900,667 $1,275,340,850 100.00% $79,708,803 
$60,564,113 $30,950,701 $44,058,851 $371,292,094 40.20% $23,205,756 
$10,464,586 $10,756,824 $15,149,895 $154,703,804 16.75% $9,668,988 
$35,284,249 $35,909,261 $45,153,811 $397,504,536 43.04% $24,844,034 
$106,312,948 $77,616,786 $104,362,557 $923,500,434 100.00% $57,718,777 
$7,185,242 $7,796,606 $9,685,620 $45,165,717 27.45% $2,822,857 
$685,364 $923,167 $5,458,103 $7,066,634 4.29% $441,665 
$4,004,869 $2,869,354 $2,803,696 $35,504,641 21.58% $2,219,040 
$-   $-   $-   $16,685,267 10.14% $1,042,829 
$-   $-   $-   $24,499,886 14.89% $1,531,243 
$2,895,684 $2,867,083 $2,738,977 $23,622,378 14.36% $1,476,399 
$2,985,934 $727,944 $1,991,511 $9,897,076 6.01% $618,567 
$-   $-   $-   $2,100,000 1.28% $131,250 
$17,757,093 $15,184,154 $22,677,907 $164,541,599 100.00% $10,283,850 
$124,070,041 $92,800,940 $127,040,464 $1,088,042,033 100.00% $68,002,627 
$23,659,195 $16,304,246 $14,317,615 $243,003,054 16.0% $15,187,691 
$11,227,209 $11,540,180 $11,121,400 $96,748,554 6.4% $6,046,785 
$33,277,763 $24,696,120 $22,524,002 $185,702,423 12.3% $11,606,401 
$-   $-   $-   $17,125,277 1.1% $1,070,330 
$-   $-   $-   $976,880 0.1% $61,055 
$45,643,082 $30,773,549 $26,036,008 $273,946,264 18.1% $17,121,642 
$54,897,831 $55,067,657 $56,434,625 $497,172,699 32.8% $31,073,294 
$-   $-   $-   $3,964,302 0.3% $247,769 
$5,529,902 $5,028,826 $6,923,584 $26,990,932 1.8% $1,686,933 
$19,784,046 $44,906,101 $44,850,840 $130,978,803 8.7% $8,186,175 
$1,087,720 $2,506,892 $5,959,564 $9,684,252 0.6% $605,266 
$2,846,621 $3,088,124 $10,852,068 $23,862,275 1.6% $1,491,392 
$-   $2,386,372 $1,541,425 $3,927,797 0.3% $245,487 
$197,953,369 $196,298,067 $200,561,131 $1,514,083,512 100.0% $94,630,220 
Year (1988/89-2003/04). See qualifications on page 9.
APPENDIX G: GRAPHS: ACTUAL EXPENDITURES BY OP
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